Chevron's Sour Lake: How a Decades-Long Legal Battle Exemplifies the Need for Changes in U.S. Law by Sligh, Madeleine Nicole & Sligh, Madeleine Nicole
CHEVRON’S SOUR LAKE:  HOW A DECADES-LONG 
LEGAL BATTLE EXEMPLIFIES THE NEED FOR 
CHANGES IN U.S. LAW  
By 
Madeleine Sligh 
Copyright © Madeleine Sligh 2019 
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the 
CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN SUDIES  
In Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
In the Graduate College 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA  
2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of Figures / 6 
Abstract / 7 
Introduction / 8 
 Methodologies / 8 
 Objectives / 9 
 Bias / 10 
Chapter 1: History of the Litigation  
 Introduction / 11 
The Beginnings: Texaco in Ecuador / 12 
Class Action Lawsuits / 13 
Aguinda I / 15 
Plaintiffs’ Allegations / 15 
Texaco’s Defense: Jurisdiction / 17 
Texaco’s Defense: Joinder / 19 
Judgment Day / 20 
Appeals and New York’s Judgment Laws / 21 
Important Historical Events / 22 
The 1995 Settlement / 23 
The Environmental Management Act of 1999 / 24 
The Bilateral Investment Treaty / 25 
The $45 Billion Dollar Merger / 27 
Aguinda II in Ecuador / 27 
Enforcement Isn’t Easy / 30 
The U.S. & RICO / 30 
Chevron’s Arbitration Attempts / 33 
Foreign Judgment Collections / 35 
Conclusion / 37 
Chapter 2: Humanizing the Parties  
 Introduction / 38 
 A Profile of the Oriente / 38  
  Texaco’s Development of the Region / 40 
  The Consequences of Texaco’s Actions / 42 
  PetroEcuador’s Operations / 45 
  The Oriente Now / 48 
 Steven Donziger: The Man, the Myth, the Legend / 50 
 The Dark Side of Donziger / 54 
Chapter 3: The Media Frenzy… Fake News? 
 Introduction / 58 
Media & Legal Strategy: ChevronToxico & The Amazon Post / 59 
Toxic Tours / 62 
Crude / 65 
  Chevron in Crude / 67 
  The Crude Outtakes / 68 
 Conclusion / 69 
 4 
Chapter 4: Lessons Learned  
 Introduction / 71 
 Ecuador was an Alternate, But Not An Adequate Forum / 72 
  The Aguinda I Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Was Improper / 73 
  Corruption Concerns / 75 
  Enforcing Foreign Judgments After Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals / 76 
 Alien Tort Statute Protections Under the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine / 77 
  ATS in Aguinda I / 77 
 Chevron’s Use of an Arbitral Tribunal to Counteract Ecuador’s Judgment / 80 
 The Dangers of 28 U.S.C.§1782 International Discovery Evidence in U.S. Courts / 82 
  The Outtakes: Coming to a §1782 Claim Near You / 83 
 The Need for a Federal Anti-SLAPP Statute / 86 
Conclusion / 89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to begin by thanking my Committee Chair and Advisor, Dr. Marcela Vasquez. 
I immensely appreciate the amount of academic and personal support you have given me 
throughout my time in LAS. You encouraged me to pursue this Masters, and for that I will always 
be grateful. 
I would also like to thank the rest of my committee members, Dean Marc Miller, Dr. Tom-
Zé B. da Silva, and Professor James Hopkins. Thank you all for taking the time to read and offer 
suggestions on my thesis.  Dean Miller, your vision of law students pursuing dual-degrees has not 
only been instrumental in the growth of the law school, but also incredibly encouraging personally. 
You have provided so many opportunities for me over the course of my law career, and I will never 
be able to thank you enough. I look forward to seeing what you have next for the Arizona Law 
community. Tom-Zé, you have been a mentor to me in the LAS department since my first semester, 
and I will always be grateful for your candor, your affable personality, and your feijoadas. 
Professor Hopkins, thank you for agreeing to join my committee without really knowing me. Your 
enthusiasm and interest in the intersection of indigenous rights and the law is incredibly infectious.  
Thank you to Steven Donziger for taking the time out of your busy schedule to talk with 
me and answer all of my questions.  
Thank you to Claudia Diaz-Combs, I am so grateful for your support in my pursuit of this 
topic and your kindness. I hope if you read this that I still have your stamp of approval. 
 I could not have completed this thesis without the support and love of my family and 
friends. To my parents, thank you for supporting me and for not gawking when I said I wanted to 
spend yet another year in school to complete a dual degree. I truly could not have asked for more 
encouraging people to call my family.  To Alex, I will never be able to say thank you enough for 
the amount of coffee, late-night edits, and emotional support you provided throughout this process. 
I love you and I am incredibly grateful for you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: A Timeline of Events.        12 
Figure 2: A Map of the Regions of Ecuador.       39 
Figure 3: Map of the Indigenous Populations of Ecuador.     39 
Figure 4: A Map of the Areas Operated By Texaco between 1964-1990.    41 
Figure 5: Native Frogs Live Covered in Oil as a result of the pollution.   43 
Figure 6: An oil pit. The yellow tape reads “Peligro” or “Danger”.    43 
Figure 7: Oil contaminates the rivers in the Amazon.     44 
Figure 8: An indigenous woman washes her laundry in the oil contaminated waters. 44 
Figure 9: Florinda Yela, 75, “outside her house which sits above the contaminated  
oil pit left by Texaco (now Chevron) near Lago Agrio, Ecuador.”   44 
Figure 10: Abandoned Barrels with the Texaco Logo in the Oriente.   44 
Figure 11: Children walk along the pipelines to walk places in their towns.   47 
Figure 12: SOTE provides an unfortunate laundry line.     47 
Figure 13: In some places, the oil has permeated the ground,    49 
causing people who step in it to sink. 
Figure 14: Steven Donziger in Ecuador.       50 
Figure 15: Donny Rico, a character the plaintiffs created. His New York  
accent is supposed to represent corrupt corporations in the U.S.   60 
Figure 16: A Still from The Amazon Post’s “‘The Legal Fraud of the Century.’”   61 
Figure 17: Plaintiffs’ lawyer Pablo Fajardo leads a Toxic Tour.    63 
Figure 18: President Rafael Correa on a Toxic Tour.      63 
Figure 19: President Rafael Correa on his visit the Oriente in 2014.          64 
Figure 20: Actress Mia Farrow on a visit to the Oriente in 2014.    64 
Figure 21: Rene Santos, vocalist of Puerto Rican band Calle 13,     64 
on his visit in 2014. 
Figure 22: Activist and environmentalist Donald Moncayo in 2011.   64 
Figure 23: Actress Darryl Hannah in 2007.       65 
Figure 24: Actor Danny Glover in 2013.       65 
Figure 25: The poster for the movie Crude.       66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In 1993, a group of Ecuadorian plaintiffs filed a complaint against oil giant Texaco in the 
U.S. Their cause of action? An oil spill the size of Manhattan, an environmental crisis referred to 
by numerous environmentalists, ecologists, and investigative journalists as the “Rain Forest 
Chernobyl.”1 This thesis examines the ongoing litigation, a “legal suicide mission,”2 undertaken 
by animated American lawyer Steven Donziger on behalf of the indigenous people of the Oriente 
region. Their opponent, Chevron, acquired Texaco in 2001, and went on to become the second 
highest producer of oil worldwide.3  
This thesis aims to explain the tangled and extensive history of this case. It describes the 
legal mechanisms at work and how they affect the litigation for a non-legal audience, and, unlike 
most legal literature, it explores the history and the people of the Oriente region, in addition to 
profiling Steven Donziger, the plaintiffs’ attorney. It also analyzes how both parties have used the 
media as weapons against the opposing party. The final objective of this thesis is to use this case 
as a lesson for how U.S. law must change in order to best protect not only human rights victims, 
but also U.S. corporations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Paul M. Barrett, Law of the Jungle: The $19 Billion Legal Battle Over Oil In The Rain Forest and The Lawyer 
Who’d Stop at Nothing to Win (Penguin Random House 2014) at 85. See also Maya Steinitz, The Case for an 
International Court of Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press 2019) at 62, See Link TV: Latin Pulse, Ecuador: 
The Tribes vs. Chevron-Texaco, available on YouTube (2009) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xj6xqzNQ_W0. 
2 Peter Maass, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil (Vintage Books 2009) at 90. 
3 Barrett supra note 1 at 56. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This thesis will examine the arduous and complex litigation surrounding oil giants Texaco 
and Chevron in their decades-long litigation against the indigenous people of Ecuador. Chapter 1 
will focus on the history of this complex litigation and explain, in layman’s terms, the legal 
mechanisms at work. Chapter 2 will discuss the parties themselves including: the indigenous 
people of Lago Agrio, plaintiffs’ attorney Steven Donziger, and the oil companies involved. 
Chapter 3 will analyze how the media has been heavily involved in legal strategy for both Chevron 
and the plaintiffs. Chapter 4 will use this litigation to highlight areas of the law that need to change. 
Specifically, the final chapter will discuss: (1) the incorrect forum non conveniens dismissal in 
Aguinda I, and the need for a different standard for the enforcement of judgments rendered after 
forum non conveniens dismissals, (2) the need to broaden the current restrictions for when federal 
courts can hear Alien Tort Statute cases, (3) the growing trend in international business toward 
arbitration, how the tribunal erred in re-litigating the case, and how tribunals must be more diligent 
in investigating whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, (4) the need for a higher standard of review 
in regards to using evidence in a §1782 international discovery claim in U.S. Courts, and (5), the 
need for a federal anti-SLAPP statute. 
 
Methodologies 
 Researching the laws and how they work involve mainly archival research through the 
Internet and through books. In addition to reading the countless filings, I opted for the legal Internet 
resources Westlaw and Lexis in order to complete the in-depth legal research. I, unfortunately, was 
unable to travel to Ecuador to complete interviews in person with the people of the Oriente region.  
I conducted the ethnographic portion of my research by reading hundreds of news and magazine 
 9 
articles about what was going on in the Oriente. These sources were from the U.S., Ecuador, and 
from large international news’ sources. This research aided in compiling my timeline, in gathering 
information about how Texaco’s activity affected the people of the region, and in analyzing how 
the media influenced the case. In addition to interviewing plaintiffs’ attorney Steven Donziger, I 
also read Paul Barret’s Law of the Jungle, Peter Maass’ Crude World, and Maya Steinitz’s The 
Case for an International Court of Civil Justice. I relied on these three print resources due to their 
presentation of both sides of the litigation, and their analysis of the law. I attempted to reach out 
to Chevron’s employees’ but to no avail. For their stance on the litigation, I relied mainly on their 
official press releases.  I also watched the documentary Crude, the 60 Minutes interview, dozens 
of interviews and news stories about the situation in the Oriente, and numerous YouTube videos 
produced by activist groups for both sides. 
 
Objectives 
 Through conducting my research, I developed four main objectives and questions I wanted 
to answer. First, I wanted to compile an in-depth history of the case, as the timelines I found only 
extended to the early 2000s. Second, I wanted to explore who prompted this lawsuit; here, I aspired 
to humanize the parties, and explain how the history of Ecuador and the Oriente region led to this 
litigation. I also wanted to look into the mind of plaintiffs’ attorney Steven Donziger and explore 
his impact on the case. Third, I aimed to study the media’s influence on the trajectory of the 
litigation. Finally, I wanted to explore how the law should change as a result of the case, and if 
such a change was even possible.  
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Bias 
 I think it is important to acknowledge that through my study of this case and the people 
that I am inherently biased. I think a great injustice occurred in Ecuador and that the law and the 
U.S. and Ecuadorian justice systems have, unfortunately, failed them. Do I think Chevron is 
entirely responsible for this conduct? No. Do I think Texaco is? Yes, in cooperation with 
Ecuadorian government. Do I think Chevron has at least some responsibility in this matter because 
of their acquisition of Texaco during the original litigation? Without question. Do I think both 
Chevron and Steven Donziger engaged in some questionable litigation tactics in order to win their 
case? Yes: these attorneys take zealous advocacy for their clients to the next level. Do I think the 
law can be changed? I want to tritely say yes, but the realist jurist inside me doubts that this 
situation can be resolved through the justice system. Unfortunately, I think the end result of all 
these questions is the same: the people of Ecuador are still suffering as a result of this ongoing 
litigation, and something must happen to ensure this sort of injustice does not happen again.  
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION 
 
Introduction 
 
“It was a legal suicide mission. If you want to sue oil companies, you need to patient and 
fatalistic, because you are unlikely to get to trial; even if you do, after years of pretrial 
maneuvering, you are likely to lose; and if you happen to win, it will likely require years more to 
receive court-ordered damages because oil companies can afford to appeal and appeal and 
appeal.”4 – Peter Maass  
 
 
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, “the story of the 
conflict between Chevron and residents of the Lago Agrio region of the Ecuadorian Amazon must 
be among the most extensively told in the history of the American federal judiciary.”5 The 
procedural posture and facts of this case are arduous and complex, as they have been litigated for 
the better part of three decades. Filed the year I was born, there is, quite literally, a lifetime’s worth 
of legal documents, oral arguments, and press coverage surrounding this case. For the purposes of 
this thesis, I will outline the relevant pieces of the history of the litigation, in addition to explaining 
the relevant legal framework. 
                                               
4 Maass supra note 2 at 90. 
5 Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012). See also Steinitz supra note 1 at 64. 
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Figure 1: A Timeline of Events6 
The Beginnings: Texaco in Ecuador 
 
In 1964, the Republic of Ecuador granted U.S. oil giant Texaco, and its subsidiary Texas 
Petroleum Co. (TexPet), license to explore and extract crude oil in the Amazon.7 The two parties 
signed a second contract in 1973, which allowed for Texaco to continue their oil endeavors in 
exchange for providing the government oil at below market prices for domestic consumption.8 It 
was also during this period that Texaco participated in the creation and development of EP 
PetroEcuador, the first Ecuadorian, state owned oil company.9  From 1977 until 1992, when 
Texaco withdrew entirely from Ecuador, the two oil companies worked as partners.10 Together, 
                                               
6 Made by the author. 
7Caroline Simson, A Cheat Sheet To Chevron's Epic Feud With Ecuador, LexisNexis (2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/805987/a-cheat-sheet-to-chevron-s-epic-feud-with-ecuador. 
8 Chevron Corp. v Republic of Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 202 (DC Cir. 2015). 
9 Hereinafter PetroEcuador. EP stands for Empresa Publica, or public company. 
10Chevron Feb. 2010 Press Release, Court Appointee in Chevron Ecuador Lawsuit Tied to Ecuador State-Owned Oil 
Company, Chevron (April 10, 2019), https://www.chevron.com/stories/court-appointeein-chevron-ecuador-lawsuit-
tiedto-ecuador-state-owned-oil-company 
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they extracted approximately 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day.11 When the government of 
Ecuador and Texaco were unable to agree to the terms of an extension, Texaco withdrew from the 
extraction efforts in 1992, leaving PetroEcuador to run the oil business in Ecuador alone. Texaco’s 
operations in Ecuador between 1964 and 1992 resulted in one of the largest environmental 
disasters of the 20th century, which continues to impact the indigenous communities of the Lago 
Agrio region today.12  
 
Class Action Lawsuits 
In 1993, several class action suits were filed in the U.S. by two separate groups of 30,000 
Ecuadorian and Peruvian indigenous people.13 Class action lawsuits are filed when large groups 
of people with the same or similar injuries, caused by either the same product or the same action, 
sue the defendant as a group.14 Generally, one claimant must have a claim for an amount over 
$75,000, and the group of people must be so large that they cannot reasonable be joined; this 
number is around 40, but it depends on the judge and the case.15 Traditional class action suits 
include injuries involving corporate misconduct, consumer fraud, securities fraud, products 
liability, employment practices, or mass tort litigation.16 This lawsuit is an example of mass tort 
litigation, where parties may sue because of a “massive accident, such as an airplane crash, in 
                                               
11 YCharts, Ecuador Crude Oil Production, https://ycharts.com/indicators/ecuador_crude_oil_production_annual 
(last visited April 10, 2019). For reference, one barrel of oil holds approximately 42 gallons. See American Oil & 
Gas Historical Society, History of the 42-Gallon Oil Barrel, https://aoghs.org/transportation/history-of-the-42-
gallon-oil-barrel/ (last visited April 10, 2019). 
12 Clifford Krauss, Big Victory for Chevron Over Claims in Ecuador, The New York Times, 2014. See also infra 
Chapter 2. 
13 This paper will focus on the Ecuadorian plaintiffs. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), 
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994), See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).  
14 Class Action Cases, https://litigation.findlaw.com/legal-system/class-action-cases.html (last visited April 10, 
2019).  
15 The Margarian Law Firm, How Many Plaintiffs Do You Need For a Class Action Lawsuit, 
https://margarianlaw.com/plaintiffs-class-action-lawsuit/  (last visited April 10, 2019). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
16  Class Action Cases supra note 14. 
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which many people are injured.”17 In class action cases, there is a named plaintiff who is at the 
forefront of the case; they file the case on behalf of the class, or group of people who share the 
common injury or cause of action. The named plaintiff must not only have claims that are 
representative of the class, but they also must protect the interests of the class.  
This sort of litigation has benefits for both the plaintiffs and the defendants. These types of 
lawsuits are often brought when many of the injuries are relatively minor, so it would be 
impractical or impossible for an individual to pursue legal action on their own. Plaintiffs can 
consolidate attorneys’ fees, so those who would not be able to afford to hire an attorney on their 
own can still seek redress for their injuries. Potential plaintiffs to the class action are entitled to 
notice, so that those who may not know the lawsuit is happening have the opportunity to opt-in; 
this notice normally consists of “television, an advertisement in a magazine or newspaper, or a 
posted flyer… tailored to the court case.”18 If the plaintiffs win, every member of the class action 
is entitled to something, no matter how small; if every plaintiff was to bring an individual 
claim, “payment by the defendant would be on a first-come, first-served basis.”19 Unfortunately, 
this also means that any person fitting the description of the class, no matter if they chose to opt-
in, is bound by the judgment. Further, if the defendants win, all plaintiffs in the suit are prevented 
from filing suit again; this sort of litigation also consolidates their attorneys’ efforts and subsequent 
fees.  Finally, it is also beneficial for the hectic court system, as it is a more expedited way to 
handle many expensive and time-consuming cases with the same or similar evidence. 
 
 
                                               
 
18 Id. Class members also have the right to opt out. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
19 Class Action Cases supra note 14.  
 15 
Aguinda I 
Aguinda v. Texaco20 was named after Maria Aguinda, an indigenous tribe member.  
Aguinda I was “filed in the house of Texaco,”21 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York22, only a few miles from where Texaco was incorporated.23  It exemplified a “new 
kind of class action seeking to hold American corporations responsible for alleged misdeeds 
overseas.”24  The driving force behind the plaintiffs’ legal team was Steven Donziger, an American 
lawyer, Harvard Law graduate, and former Central American journalist; his combination of 
charisma, legal know-how, and knowledge of when to involve the media in order to best “market 
[the case against Texaco] to the American public”25 made for a lethal combination, one Texaco 
and Chevron severely underestimated and continue to fight against.26 
 
Plaintiffs’ Allegations 
 The complaints alleged, in sum, that (1) Texaco was responsible for polluting the rain 
forests and rivers in Ecuador and Peru between 1964 and 1992, (2) that “Texaco improperly 
dumped large quantities of toxic by-products of the drilling process into the local rivers, contrary 
to prevailing industry practice of pumping these substances back into the emptied wells,” (3) that 
Texaco also used other inappropriate means of “eliminating toxic substances, such as burning 
them, dumping them directly into landfills, and spreading them on the local dirt roads”, and (4) 
“that the Trans–Ecuadoran Pipeline, constructed by Texaco… leaked large quantities of petroleum 
                                               
20 Hereinafter Aguinda I. It is also important to note that a 1996 verdict incorrectly uses the name Aquinda in the 
lawsuit. See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc. 945 F. Supp. 625 (1996). 
21 Barrett supra note 1 at 48. 
22 Hereinafter S.D.N.Y.  
23 See infra Texaco’s Defense: Jurisdiction. 
24 Barrett supra note 1 at 50. 
25 Id. at 47. 
26 See infra Steven Donziger: The Man, The Myth, the Legend. 
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into the environment.”27  The plaintiffs estimate that “Texaco's acts and omissions have resulted 
in the discharge of oil into the…environment at a rate in excess of 3,000 gallons per day for 20 
years,” and as a result, the Ecuadorian Amazon is unsafe for flora, fauna, or the indigenous 
populations.28  
The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of these practices, they, and the communities they 
represented, suffered “various physical injuries, including poisoning and the development of pre-
cancerous growths.”29 These physical injuries have subsequently developed over time, and now 
include cancer, birth defects, and myriad other debilitating diseases that come from unclean water 
and pollution.30 The actual medical documentation and lab tests for these precancerous growths 
remain to be seen by any court of law and are primarily based on anecdotal evidence.31  
As a result, the plaintiffs “sought money damages under theories of negligence, public and 
private nuisance, strict liability, medical monitoring, trespass, civil conspiracy, and violations of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act.”32 Further, they sought: 
“extensive equitable relief to redress contamination of the water supplies and environment, 
including: financing for environmental cleanup to create access to potable water and 
hunting and fishing grounds; renovating or closing the Trans–Ecuadorian Pipeline; creation 
of an environmental monitoring fund; establishing standards to govern future Texaco oil 
development; creation of a medical monitoring fund; an injunction restraining Texaco from 
entering into activities that risk environmental or human injuries, and restitution.”33 
 
The plaintiffs estimated the damages would amount in a number exceeding 10 billion dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
27 Jota (2d Cir. 1998). 
28 Gabriel Ashanga Jota et. al, 1994 WL 16495105 (S.D.N.Y.). 
29 Id. See also Leonard J. Brooks & Paul Dunn, Business & Professional Ethics for Directors, Executives, and 
Accountants (7th ed., Cengage Learning 2015) at 47. 
30 Crude, Joe Berlinger et. al (2009).  
31 Barrett supra note 1 at 210. 
32 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) 
33 Id. 
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Texaco’s Defense: Jurisdiction 
 
In the many pre-trial motions they submitted, Texaco argued that the jurisdiction, forum, 
and venue were not proper, and that the case would be better heard in Ecuador, where the witnesses 
were, the evidence was, and the actual alleged incidents occurred. Texaco pushed for the case to 
be heard in Ecuador, arguing that “justice demanded the question of pollution liability in Ecuador 
be adjudicated in Ecuador.”34 When the plaintiffs argued that the country was “too corrupt,” 
Texaco presented State Department reports and other evidence to the contrary. 
Here, it is important to distinguish between the three terms relevant to where a case can be 
litigated: forum, venue, and jurisdiction. In sum, the venue is the geographic location, the forum 
is the particular court or arbitrator that will hear the case, and the jurisdiction is where the court 
has the authority to hear the case. While venue is relatively straightforward, there are many aspects 
to whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a case, and where a plaintiff should file their lawsuit in 
order to be the most successful case.  
Jurisdiction is divided into two main subsections: personal jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction. The court must have both in order to hear a lawsuit. Personal jurisdiction is the 
authority the courts have over a person and is broken down into two different types: specific and 
general. Specific personal jurisdiction exists when “the injury or dispute in question occurs in the 
state where the lawsuit is filed.”35 This is not the case in Aguinda, so we must move onto the next 
type, general personal jurisdiction.  General personal jurisdiction “allows a court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant… for lawsuit[s] filed in a state in which the defendant is 
                                               
34 Barrett supra note 1 at 181. 
35 Ward & Smith, P.A., Where Can Your Company Be Sued? The Basics Of Personal Jurisdiction (2019).  
https://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/where-can-your-company-be-sued-the-basics-of-personal-jurisdiction, See 
also BSNF Railway Co. v. Tyrell, 137 S.Ct. 1549 (2017). 
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[considered] ‘at home.’”36  In 2017, the Supreme Court held that a corporate defendant is “at 
home” in only three states: (1) the state in which the business is incorporated; (2) the state in which 
the business has its principal place of business; and (3), “in an ‘exceptional case,’ any state in 
which the corporation's operations are so substantial that it also is ‘at home’ in that additional state 
(or states).”37  Because Texaco is incorporated in New York, the S.D.N.Y. had general personal 
jurisdiction over the company in 1993. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the other essential type of jurisdiction; it delegates cases to 
certain courts. In U.S. courts, subject matter jurisdiction distinguishes whether the case should be 
litigated in state court or federal court, as federal courts have a more limited range of the cases 
they are allowed to preside over. Namely, in order to litigate in federal court, like the Aguinda case 
was, the case must either have diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. Diversity 
jurisdiction requires a controversy that exceeds in $75,000 and parties that are “diverse” in 
citizenship of state or incorporation. Diversity for the purposes of determining jurisdiction means 
that all plaintiffs are citizens of a different state38 than all the defendants. For corporations, their 
citizenship rests on where their “principal place of business,” or their “nerve center” of the 
company is.39 In 2010, The Supreme Court clarified that the corporate headquarters would not be 
considered the principal place of business if it is not the “the actual center of direction, control, 
and coordination;” it could not just be “simply an office where the corporation holds its board 
                                               
36 Ward & Smith supra note 34. 
37Natalie Holden, U.S. Supreme Court Narrows Scope of Personal Jurisdiction, Technology, Manufactoring & 
Transportation Industry Insider (2017), https://www.tmtindustryinsider.com/2017/06/u-s-supreme-court-narrows-
scope-of-personal-jurisdiction/. “The Court applied the tests from Goodyear and Daimler, stating that these clarified 
the holding of International Shoe to the more narrow test of only allowing a court to assert general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations “when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. See also Daimler, 571 U.S. 746 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 919). 
38 Or in this case, country. 
39 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
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meetings."40 However, this decision was not made until 2010, so in 1993, Texaco would have been 
considered “at home” in the S.D.N.Y.41 
Here, the S.D.N.Y. Court also had subject matter jurisdiction, due to the fact that the claims 
were brought under the Alien Tort Statute; this statute gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
certain claims of alleged human rights violations.42 This type of subject matter jurisdiction is called 
federal question jurisdiction, which deals with an alleged violation of the Constitution, federal law, 
or treaties that the U.S. is a part of. This case had subject matter jurisdiction because it was brought 
under the ATS,43 but the S.D.N.Y. could have heard the case regardless, due to the fact that there 
was also diversity jurisdiction. 
 
Texaco’s Defense: Joinder  
 
Texaco also argued that there was improper joinder.44 Proper joinder ensures that all parties 
“materially interested in the subject of an action”45 are present in court and, that “any right to relief 
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”46 According to Chevron, 
if they were going to be blamed for causing this damage, two key parties were missing: 
PetroEcuador, their partner in oil explorations for almost two decades, and the government of 
Ecuador, who invited and encouraged their explorations. 
                                               
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 28 U.S. Code § 1350. 
44 See Aquinda supra note 20. 
45 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. 
46 Id. 
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 Ecuador’s presence was, in fact, “held to be necessary to effectuate the extensive equitable 
relief requested, but impossible to obtain in light of their sovereign immunity.”47  In short, national 
governments are traditionally immune from criminal prosecution, unless they chose to waive that 
sovereign immunity privilege.  This is especially true in the courts of a foreign nation.  This 
protects states from foreign lawsuits so that countries cannot use their own courts to interfere with 
the running of another country.48 Because Ecuador did not waive sovereign immunity in this case, 
they could not feasibly be sued in the United States.49 
 
Judgment Day 
After almost a decade, and despite the overwhelming evidence that an environmental 
disaster had indeed occurred50, Aguinda I was dismissed in 1996 prior to trial on procedural 
grounds; the actual substance of the case and facts presented were not considered in the dismissal.  
The two main factors of the dismissal were forum non conveniens and international comity. 
Forum non conveniens is a legal principle that acknowledges a more appropriate venue for a case 
to be heard; here, that forum was the courts of Ecuador. Essentially, the court decided that “despite 
the fact that Texaco’s headquarters was just a few miles from the courthouse”51 where the case 
was filed, the judge concluded that the case had “everything to do with Ecuador, and nothing to 
do with the United States,”52 therefore the proper forum to hear the case would be Ecuador.  
                                               
47Aquinda supra note 20.  Sovereign immunity can also be called state immunity. See Xiaodong Yang, Sovereign 
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International comity is “the recognition a nation shows to the legislative, executive or judicial acts 
of another nation.”53  Effectively, “US courts should defer to the laws of other nations when actions 
are taken pursuant to those laws.54 By dismissing the case to Ecuador, the U.S. was handing the 
Ecuadorian legal system the reigns, to do justice the way they sought fit. 
 
Appeals and New York’s Judgment Laws 
On appeal, in 1998, the Second Circuit remanded the case, holding that “that a forum non 
conveniens dismissal was “inappropriate absent a requirement that Texaco consent to Ecuadorian 
jurisdiction.”55 In 2001, after much negotiation, Texaco agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of 
Ecuador, upon the condition that they reserved the right to contest the validity of Ecuadorian courts 
under the conditions permitted by New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money -- Judgments 
Recognition Act.56   
The New York Uniform Foreign Country Money -- Judgments Recognition Act was 
created to “promote the efficient enforcement of New York judgments abroad by assuring foreign 
jurisdictions that their judgments would receive streamlined enforcement in New York.”57 The 
grounds for non-recognition  include (1) lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, (2) lack of notice 
to the defendant, (3) the judgment was obtained via fraud, (4) the cause of action for which the 
judgment is based is offensive to public policy, (5) the judgment conflicts with a separate final and 
conclusive judgment, (6) the proceeding was contrary to an agreement between the parties to 
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otherwise settle the dispute in question outside of that court (whether it be in a different court of 
law or through arbitration or mediation), (7) inconvenient forum, or (8) the judgment is involving 
defamation and the country does not protect freedom of speech or freedom of the press to the 
extent that New York law would.58  Texaco did not know it yet, but they would, in some capacity 
or another, attempt to argue all of these factors. 
As a result of Texaco’s consent, District Court dismissed the case again on the ground of 
forum non conveniens59; this time the Second Circuit affirmed.60 These eight exceptions left for 
contesting foreign judgments have left the door wide open for Chevron to contest any Ecuadorian 
judgment. While, “[in] theory Chevron agreed to abide by whatever the Ecuadorean courts 
decided… in reality New York and federal law offer powerful protections against defendants who 
believe they are the victims of an improper or fraudulent procedure in another country.”61  
Texaco’s reservations to their consent of jurisdiction served as a harbinger for what future 
litigation was to come. 
Important Historical Events 
In the decade it took for Aguinda I to make its way through the courts, “several important 
events had transpired.”62 These included: (1) the 1995 Settlement between Texaco, PetroEcuador, 
and the Government of Ecuador, (2) the Environmental Management Act, (3) the signing of the 
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60 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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Bilateral Investment Treaty between Ecuador and the U.S, and (4) the merger of Chevron and 
Texaco. These details of these crucial events are outlined below. 
The 1995 Settlement 
When the judge remanded the case to Ecuador, “Texaco had every reason to believe that 
the plaintiffs' case would disintegrate.”63 This was in large part because of a settlement Texaco 
made with the government of Ecuador and PetroEcuador a few years prior to the dismissal, via a 
contract entitled “Contract For Implementing of Environmental Remedial Work and Release From 
Obligations, Liability and Claims.”64 As a part of the settlement, Texaco agreed to fund 
environmental remediation projects “in exchange for ... a release from liability for environmental 
impact falling outside the scope of that settlement.”65 This settlement was “finalized in 1998, after 
[Texaco]… spent roughly $40 million on the remediation” of approximately 1/3 of the pits.66 The 
completion of this work triggered the 1998 Release, which terminated “all rights and obligations 
between the parties [and any related subsidiaries]… [except] the continuation of the pending 
lawsuits.”67  
This settlement is Chevron’s main defense in their argument that they are not culpable for 
the damages in the Lago Agrio region; Chevron acquired Texaco in 2001, long after Texaco was 
“released, absolved, and discharged” by the government of Ecuador and PetroEcuador from any 
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wrongdoings in the Oriente.68 The plaintiffs, however, argue that not only is this contract invalid 
because Texaco did not follow through at the standard expected, but if it is valid, this case would 
fall under the pending lawsuit exemption in the 1995 agreement69 Further, they claim that “a 
settlement with an overly compliant government does not absolve Texaco of responsibility for the 
harm their activities caused to the individual plaintiffs in the lawsuit.”70 To them, this settlement 
is irrelevant. 
The Environmental Management Act of 1999 
During Aguinda I, Donziger began to formulate a plan in case he was forced to bring the 
case in Ecuador, one which, in hindsight, he would be glad he followed through with.  A major 
hurdle existed to bringing the case in Ecuador: the Ecuadorian courts did not have a class action 
mechanism. No group of people had ever come together with a common injury and attempted to 
hold a defendant responsible. In fact, “until that time, protection of the environment… was a 
prerogative on the state, and only the executive branch was able to act on behalf of the general 
population.”71 This was a problem for the plaintiffs, who attempted to represent the interests of not 
only the environment, but also the affected members of the indigenous populations of the Oriente 
as a whole. 
As a result, Donziger spearheaded the Environmental Management Act,72 which granted 
Ecuadorian citizens a “new private right of action for damages for the cost of remediation of 
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environmental harm.”73 Without this Act, the case could not have been heard in the Ecuadorian 
court; luckily for the plaintiffs, the Ecuadorian Legislature passed the EMA in 1999.74 This law 
allows individuals to represent the “affected indigenous communities with regard to their 
collective right to a healthy environment,” 75 and remains a keystone of Ecuador’s environmental 
legal framework.76 This is perhaps one of the only good things for the environment to come out of 
the litigation thus far, although Donziger denies any involvement in the passing of the EMA, and 
Texaco used the plaintiffs’ ingenuity as a building block to their claim that Ecuador was a place 
where laws could be bought. 
The Bilateral Investment Treaty 
In order to attract U.S. business to Ecuador, the two countries signed the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT), which took effect in 1997. The terms of the treaty allowed Ecuador to 
make a “standing offer to American investors to arbitrate disputes involving investments that 
existed on or after the treaty’s effective date.”77 Investment for purposes of the treaty could include 
“a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value and associated with an 
investment.”78This was meant to draw U.S. businesses to Ecuador, with the assurance that disputes 
would be solved through arbitration. 
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Arbitration is an “out-of-court resolution of a dispute between parties to a contract, decided 
by an impartial third party” in a much more efficient and less costly manner.79 Detailed contracts 
like the BIT are precise in how potential conflicts will be settled under arbitration; parties agree to 
the tribunal, where the arbitration will be held, and the arbitrators, who will decide the case, before 
they sign the contract.  
Particularly in international transactions, there are many benefits to choosing to arbitrate. 
Choosing the venue in advance provides both parties with the peace of mind that potential disputes 
will be solved in a forum that is convenient and fair for both parties, as opposed to dealing with a 
different country’s legal system. Further, arbitrations are normally decided by three arbitrators; 
one chosen by the plaintiffs, one chosen by the defendants, and one agreed upon by both parties, 
limiting potential bias. Arbitration is also much faster than litigation, as “often convoluted rules of 
evidence and procedure do not apply in arbitration proceedings -- making them less stilted and 
more easily adapted to the needs of those involved.”80 Where pretrial matters in litigation can take 
years, “in arbitrations, most matters, such as who will be called as a witness and what documents 
must be produced, are handled with a simple phone call.”81 Arbitration proceedings can also be 
conducted in private; their confidential nature often draws large companies. Further final 
judgments from an arbitral tribunal are much easier to enforce in other countries, as most countries 
recognize the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, also known as the New York Convention.82 This allows for relatively easy collection of 
arbitral judgment in 159 countries around the world, including the U.S. and Ecuador.83 
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While there are many benefits to arbitration, there are some negatives. Final judgments are 
difficult to counteract; the appellate process in arbitration is very limited. Further, arbitrators “tend 
to favor businesses;” meaning that large corporations who arbitrate a lot of disputes can have an 
advantage against smaller plaintiffs.84 These factors would prove particularly problematic for the 
country of Ecuador in the late 2000s, as Texaco would use the BIT in their war against the 
plaintiffs.85 
 
The $45 Billion Dollar Merger 
In 2001, Chevron acquired Texaco for 45 billion dollars; with the acquisition came the 
responsibilities of this lawsuit.86 At the time, the litigation was considered so insignificant that 
Chevron allegedly did not inform its shareholders about the litigation when asking for approval 
for the acquisition.87 The 2001 merger resulted in the fourth largest oil company in the world, 
ChevronTexaco.88 
 
Aguinda II in Ecuador 
Meanwhile, in 2003, the plaintiffs refiled the lawsuit (hereinafter Aguinda II) in Lago 
Agrio, Ecuador, and it began to make its way through the Ecuadorian legal system. Led by 
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Donziger and his Ecuadorian co-counsel, attorney Pablo Fajardo, the plaintiffs geared up to fight 
Chevron again, bringing forth the same allegations of environmental harm to the indigenous people 
of the Oriente.  
Chevron, on the other hand had a new defense strategy. Chevron’s defense at its core was 
three-fold:(1) everything Texaco did in Ecuador was legal; (2) Texaco spent $40 million on 
environmental cleanup; and (3) as a result the “Ecuadoran government released it from further 
liability to the government.”89 Further, they argued that Chevron had never participated in oil 
drilling in Ecuador, so they were not liable for the damage done. 
The discovery process, where the Lago Agrio court and the parties searched for and 
gathered evidence, was so extensive that it lasted a decade. By the time a judgment was issued, 
there were over 200,000 pages of legal documents and evidence in the record.90 The court ordered 
“more than one hundred judicial field inspections to be conducted in the former oil fields with the 
purpose of determining whether the activities of the TexPet Consortium had indeed caused any 
harm to the environment, and to quantify those damages.”91 After much contention from both 
parties that the proposed expert witnesses were biased, the Court appointed an independent field 
expert, Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega.92 Cabrera’s 2008 report was detailed and controversial: “the 
centerpiece of in Chevron's allegations of fraud and corruption by plaintiffs.”93 The report found 
the damage to the Oriente region to be widespread and appalling, worthy of over $27 billion dollars 
of compensation.  
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In 2011, almost two decades after the original case was first filed, the Provincial Court of 
Justice of Sucumbíos issued a 188-page decision highly relying upon Cabrera’s report, of which a 
judgment of 9.5 billion dollars was awarded to the plaintiffs. This amount was to double if Chevron 
did not immediately acknowledge the damage they had caused and publicly apologize.94 From the 
9.5 billion, “$8.6 billion was intended for groundwater and soil remediation, the restoration of the 
native flora, fauna, and aquatic life, the implementation of a potable water system, a healthcare 
system and the rebuilding of ethnic communities and indigenous cultures.”95 Ten percent of the 
damages “were to be paid to the Amazon Defense Front,”96 a company set up by the plaintiffs in 
Gibraltar to disburse the judgment amongst the plaintiffs and their attorneys.97 This was the 
moment Donziger and his associates had been waiting decades for. The judgment, according to 
the plaintiffs, was a long time coming, so much so that: 
“by the time the judge, Nicolás Zambrano, issued his decision, the case had been going on 
for eighteen years. It had outlasted jurists on two continents. Zambrano was the sixth judge 
to preside in Ecuador; one federal judge in New York had died before he could rule on the 
case. The litigation even outlasted Texaco: in 2001, the company was subsumed by 
Chevron, which inherited the lawsuit. The dispute is now considered one of the nastiest 
legal contests in memory, a spectacle almost as ugly as the pollution that prompted it.”98 
 
The 18-billion-dollar judgment made history as “one of the largest judgments ever imposed by a 
court for environmental pollution.”99  The plaintiffs had won the battle, but they had no idea what 
more the war had in store for them. 
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Almost immediately, a Chevron spokesperson “denounced the judgment as “illegitimate,” 
“unenforceable,” “the product of fraud,” and “contrary to the legitimate scientific evidence,’”100 
and began the appellate process in Ecuador. At the center of their appeal in Ecuador was that 
Cabrera’s report was “ghost-written” by the plaintiffs, and that Judge Zambrano was bribed by 
them. The appellate court and eventually the Ecuadorian Supreme Court disagreed, affirming the 
judgment in 2012. 
 
Enforcement Isn’t Easy 
So, the plaintiffs had won billions of dollars… now what? Chevron had no assets and 
therefore no money in Ecuador, meaning that the plaintiffs only hope to see any of this money was 
to attempt enforcing the judgment rendered in Ecuador in other countries. Chevron had thought of 
this; by the time the Lago Agrio court had entered their judgment, “Chevron had already moved 
in at least two different fronts outside of Ecuador to block the enforcement of an imminent adverse 
judgment.”101 Chevron was protecting themselves, and their assets, on a global scale, first through 
a U.S. lawsuit, second through arbitration proceedings, and lastly, through other, foreign courts. 
The U.S. & RICO 
Chevron, “risking the wrath of the gods of irony,” brought the case back to the very court 
where Aguinda I was filed, just days before the Aguinda II judgment was announced.102 Seeking a 
preliminary injunction under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 
statute, Chevron hoped to convince a U.S. Court that Donziger and the plaintiffs’ attorneys were 
money-hungry wolves, willing to do anything to obtain a judgment, including flagrantly breaking 
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the law. RICO was designed to prevent criminal business practices or obtaining money through 
illegal mechanisms, which Chevron argued was a fit for this set of facts. Chevron claimed that 
Donziger and his legal team belonged with the mafia and mob bosses that this statute was designed 
to take down, and that the Ecuadorian justice system was the right hand of his corrupt agenda to 
make Chevron pay.103 
 By obtaining a preliminary injunction, Chevron aimed to prevent the Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
from collecting the judgment in the U.S. before they could fight it. Chevron insisted that the 
Ecuadorian courts could not effectively enter a judgment against them, due to the fact that the 
courts were “fundamentally tainted by fraud.”104 In an almost perfect example of the tables turning, 
Chevron argued: 
“that the New York court where they had once said the case did not belong provided a fine 
venue to litigate the rights and wrongs of the rainforest. Chevron branded the judicial 
proceedings in Ecuador – which in the 1990s, Texaco had sworn would be squeaky-clean—
a cesspool of vice. Donziger, who had warned against official impropriety in Ecuador, now 
defended the trial in Lago as perhaps unconventional by American standards, but 
essentially fair. With billions at stake, no one worried about consistency. ”105 
The irony was palpable, but U.S. District Court Judge Kaplan ultimately agreed with Chevron, 
finding  “that the case had been in essence a grand act of extortion executed through bribery, 
money laundering, and coercion.”106 Judge Kaplan, however, went one step further in issuing the 
preliminary injunction, as it attempted to bar “the enforcement [of the 18 billion dollar judgment], 
anywhere in the world outside of Ecuador, of any judgment rendered against it by the Ecuadorian 
court.”107  He stated in his opinion that there was “ample evidence of fraud in the Ecuadorian 
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proceedings… and that such evidence was sufficiently serious to warrant a preliminary 
injunction.”108 This injunction was eventually overturned by the 2nd Circuit, citing that Judge 
Kaplan did not have the authority to rule a judgment anywhere in the world entirely.109 
 When the U.S. District Court heard Chevron’s case for a permanent injunction, which 
would stop the plaintiffs from ever enforcing a judgment in the U.S., Judge Kaplan was again 
willing to hear Chevron’s tales of ghost writers and bribery from the justice system in third world. 
He was all too eager to express his dislike of not only the corrupt practices in Ecuador, but also 
the corrupt practices of Steven Donziger. In fact, Judge Kaplan wrote in his opinion that the 
plaintiffs’ actions “include[d] things that normally come only out of Hollywood;”110 appropriate, 
given the fact that accredited documentarian Joe Berlinger had released Crude, a film about the 
Lago case, in 2009. In fact, the outtakes of the documentary were obtained through international 
discovery for this trial, wherein Judge Kaplan found a treasure trove of evidence to fuel Chevron’s 
corruption claims. In 2014, he held “the issue here is not what happened in the Oriente more than 
twenty years ago and who, if anyone, now is responsible for any wrongs then done… [rather] it is 
instead… [about] whether a court decision was procured by corrupt means, regardless of whether 
the cause was just.”111 He continued, holding that the Lago case was, indeed, “obtained by corrupt 
means” and that the plaintiffs’ lawyers would “not be allowed to benefit from that in any way.”112 
Chevron had effectively told Donziger and his associates to look for his $18 billion outside of the 
U.S., because the judgment would not be enforceable here. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this decision 
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in 2016, and in 2017, the Supreme Court denied Donziger’s petition for certiorari; they declined 
to hear the case.113  The RICO suit ultimately culminated with Donziger having his license to 
practice law revoked in 2018.114  
Chevron’s Arbitration Attempts 
Another roadblock to the enforcement of the judgments are the multiple arbitration 
proceedings Chevron has brought against the country of Ecuador. In 2006, as a result of the BIT, 
Chevron commenced international arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 
The Hague, alleging that Ecuador violated the BIT by failing to resolve the “at least seven lawsuits 
against the Ecuadorean government seeking over $533 million in damages in connection with the 
1973 and 1977 agreements” that Texaco, and subsequently Chevron, filed.115 Their main cause of 
action was that Ecuador violated the BIT by failing to resolve the breach of contract lawsuits “in 
a timely fashion.”116 Ecuador objected, claiming that the tribunal had no jurisdiction because 
“Chevron’s investments in Ecuador had terminated no later than 1995, two years prior to the entry 
into force of the BIT,” and therefore Ecuador had never agreed to arbitrate with Chevron.117  
The tribunal disagreed, “finding that Chevron’s lawsuits were ‘investments’ within the 
meaning of the BIT”, therefore the dispute was arbitrable.118 The tribunal held that "Ecuador had 
delayed disposition of the lawsuits, [and it] ultimately decided against Ecuador on the majority of 
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the breach of contract claims, awarding Chevron approximately $96 million.”119 Ecuador 
challenged the award in the Dutch legal system, but the award was ultimately upheld by the Dutch 
Supreme Court. Chevron sought to enforce the award in D.C. District Court, where the award was 
affirmed, appealed by Ecuador, affirmed again, and ultimately denied certiorari by the Supreme 
Court in 2016, therefore upholding the tribunal’s decision.120 
A separate arbitration was filed in 2009, also heard at the PCA, but in front of a different 
tribunal; this arbitration was the sister to Chevron’s U.S. RICO suit. Chevron claimed that “the 
plaintiffs had ‘promised payments’ to an Ecuadoran judge ‘in return for being permitted to draft 
significant portions’ of the ruling against the American multi-national.”121 
 The tribunal agreed, noting “that Chevron's counsel had rightly claimed its evidence in the 
case to be ‘the most thorough documentary, video, and testimonial proof of fraud ever put before 
an arbitral tribunal.’"122 In August of 2018, they found Ecuador guilty of "’denial of justice’ and 
ordered it to annul its sentence against Chevron.”123 Not only did the “tribunal unanimously [hold] 
that [the] $9.5 billion pollution judgment by Ecuador’s Supreme Court against Chevron ‘was 
procured through fraud, bribery and corruption and was based on claims that had been already 
settled and released by the Republic of Ecuador years earlier…’, it also alluded to the fact that  
“the oil giant now stands to be awarded hundreds of millions of dollars in costs by The Hague's 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.”124 The PCA ordered Ecuador to “take immediate steps, of its 
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own choosing, to remove the status of enforceability from the Lago Agrio Judgment.”125 As of 
April 2019, this PCA award has yet to be rendered, and the plaintiffs are still aiming to enforce 
this judgment, as Ecuador has not taken steps toward removing the enforceability status.126  
Foreign Judgment Collections 
When the plaintiffs failed to collect the judgment in the U.S., they moved onto other 
countries. Donziger and associates were prepared for this; according to the internal memo written 
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys called Invictus, they had a multi-faceted strategy of where to collect the 
judgment.127 Their “non-exhaustive list of nations” for international enforcement included 25 
countries, with particular emphasis on The Philippines, Singapore, Australia, and other Latin 
American countries, like Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela.  
Donziger’s strategy has, so far, failed in all countries the plaintiffs have attempted to collect 
their judgment in; this is mainly due to the fact that Chevron has counteracted any attempts to 
collect judgments by placing all assets in their subsidiary companies. So, for example, rather than 
collecting from Chevron Canada, where all the assets for Chevron in Canada are held, the plaintiffs 
are forced to collect from the parent U.S. company Chevron in Canada, where they have no 
funds.128 This is because the subsidiary companies are considered “separate legal entit[ies] from 
Chevron Corp., meaning… [their] assets [are not] tangled up in [the] bid to collect on [the] massive 
Ecuadorian judgment.”129 Although the plaintiffs have argued extensively that they should be able 
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to pursue the subsidiaries, so far this has failed, as the foreign courts want to protect their own 
businesses, in addition to the business Chevron is bringing to their country. 
Although the plaintiffs continue to seek enforcement in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the 
U.S., and even Gibraltar, Chevron has yet to pay.130 Argentinian, Brazilian, and Canadian courts 
have so far protected the assets in Chevron’s subsidiary companies, holding that the plaintiffs can 
exclusively look for their judgment in the parent Chevron, if at all.  In 2017, an Argentinian 
court refused to recognize the judgment, citing lack of jurisdiction; an appellate court affirmed this 
decision in July 2018.131 In November 2017, “Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice unanimously 
rejected an attempt to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in Brazil.”132 According to Chevron, 
“Brazil’s Deputy Prosecutor General stated the judgment was ‘issued in an irregular manner, 
especially under deplorable acts of corruption.’”133 A Canadian court in January of 2017 declined 
the case for similar reasons and an appellate court upheld this decision in May 2018.134 Litigation 
in the Canadian courts is still ongoing, but as of April 2019, “Canada's Supreme Court has declined 
to review a decision that [the plaintiffs] can[not] go after a Canadian Chevron subsidiary's assets 
to satisfy an embattled $9.5 billion pollution judgment.”135  
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The plaintiffs “remained undeterred, saying they'll continue enforcement efforts against 
the parent company.”136 This steadfast determination to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment has 
proved consequential for the plaintiffs’ wallets. In December 2015: 
“the Supreme Court of Gibraltar issued a judgment against Amazonia Recovery Ltd., 
a Gibraltar-based company set up by the plaintiffs’ attorneys to receive and distribute funds 
resulting from the Ecuadorian judgment, awarding Chevron $28 million in damages, and 
issued a permanent injunction against Amazonia to prevent the company from assisting or 
supporting the case against Chevron in any way. The court issued a similar ruling in May 
2018 against directors of Amazonia, Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia, Ecuadorian 
attorney Pablo Fajardo, and Servicios Fromboliere for their role in attempting to enforce 
the ruling, this time awarding $38 million in damages to Chevron.”137  
Chevron’s retaliation campaign does not end there. As of April 2019, Chevron is continuing to 
seek money from the plaintiffs’ attorneys to cover their costs and legal fees, a number “up to $32 
million.”138  
 
Conclusion  
The history of this case is vast, complex, and never-ending. News articles appear regularly with 
updates about pending and upcoming litigation. The end is not in sight for Ecuadorians waiting for 
a judgment that may never come. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HUMANIZING THE PARTIES 
 
Introduction  
 
In order to best understand the full magnitude of this litigation, we must talk about the 
people it affects. The plaintiffs are often portrayed as parading behind Donziger on a quest for 
money from a large corporation; a strategy Chevron intentionally implements. This thesis, 
however, will look beyond the legal jargon and strategic maneuvering of the courtroom. This 
chapter will discuss the Oriente region, the indigenous people that live there, and how Texaco’s 
actions affected their way of life.  It will further illuminate the person behind the litigation, Steven 
Donziger, in an attempt to see through Chevron’s portrayal of him as the corrupt plaintiffs' 
attorney. It is only through understanding all aspects of this case that one can learn from the 
mistakes; learning about the people behind the plaintiffs is an essential component. 
 
A Profile of the Oriente 
 
“ ‘What would happen in Texas if there was a spill like that?’ [Donald] Moncayo asked, pointing 
at the black lake in front of us.  
I said it would be cleaned up, quickly.  
‘We’ve been waiting seventeen years,’ he replied.” 
– Peter Maas, on his trip to Lago Agrio in 2009.139 
 
 
 The setting for this Hollywood-esque story takes place in a very real and very harsh 
environment, the Oriente rainforest in Ecuador. ”140 Prior to the 1960s, roads barely penetrated an 
area of dense, undisturbed rain forest the size of Rhode Island. This stretch of jungle was so 
isolated that its inhabitants, consisting mainly of “tens of thousands of… Cofán, Huaorani, Secoya, 
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Siona and Quichua” indigenous tribes, lived for many years in complete isolation, with the 
exception of rare travelers, “who did not all have the benefit of surviving their explorations.”141 
 
 
      
 
Figure 2: Map of the Regions of Ecuador142 Figure 3: Map of the Indigenous Populations 
of Ecuador143 
 
It was not until the 1960s, when American geologists helicoptered their way into the depths 
of the jungle, that this region began its trek into the 20th century. The Ecuadorian government 
encouraged development and Texaco’s quest for oil, in hopes that it would bring some much-
needed capital and infrastructure to the small and remote South American state. Oil was deemed 
to be the “salvation of Ecuador's economy, the product that would, at last, pull the nation out of 
chronic poverty and underdevelopment.”144 The Ecuadorian government did not include 
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indigenous communities in this decision to drill for oil in their lands; according to Ecuadorian law 
at that time, “the indigenous people own[ed] the land but the government own[ed] the minerals 
beneath it.”145  This gross violation of human rights’ has been publicly deemed a mistake on the 
part of the Ecuadorian government, one that was a result of pressure from U.S. relations with Latin 
America in the 20th century; this tension caused the Ecuadorian government to act against their 
own people. 
 
Texaco’s Development of the Region 
The first exports of the extracted oil began in 1972, when “Texaco completed construction 
of a 313-mile pipeline to transport crude oil out of the remote Amazon region, across the Andes 
Mountains, to the Pacific coast.”146 This was the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline System, or the Sistema 
Oleducto Trans-Ecuatoriano, known better by its Spanish acronym, SOTE. The government was 
so thrilled by the completion of SOTE that the first barrel of “Amazon Crude was paraded through 
the streets of the capital, Quito, like a hero… in some neighborhoods, residents could get drops of 
crude to commemorate the occasion.”147 It was such a momentous occasion that “after the parade, 
the oil drum was placed on an altar-like structure at the Eloy Alfaro Military Academy.”148 
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Figure 4: A Map of the Areas Operated By Texaco between 1964-1990149 
 
As a result of Texaco’s findings, development of the region became centered around oil 
and the company. The region grew from a few thousand inhabitants to 500,000, most all of whom 
had some connection to Texaco.150 This is exemplified by the name of the regional capital, Lago 
Agrio, which provides a sort of morbid irony on two different levels. First, “in a nod to the 
corporate creator” and catalyst for the development of the Oriente, Lago Agrio “is the Spanish 
translation of the name of the American town where Texaco was born: Sour Lake.”151 Second, and 
on a more sour note, no one could have predicted how poignant that name would be in describing 
a town plagued by environmental pollution and tainted water. 
Ecuador’s quest for income came with more than a population boom in the Amazon; some 
unprecedented environmental consequences now plague the country. Although “the Hydrocarbon 
Law of 1971 required the ‘protection of the flora and fauna and other natural resources’ and 
prohibited ‘contamination of waters atmosphere and lands,’… these [legal] obligations were not 
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fleshed out with specific regulations until the 1990s, long after Texaco had left the country.”152 In 
fact, “for decades, they were empty platitudes,” and Texaco knew it.153 Now the Ecuadorian 
Constitution, “guarantee[s] its citizens a ‘right to live in an environment free of contamination,” 
but this version of the Constitution was leftist President Rafael Correa’s, implemented in 2008, 
perhaps in response to the horrible contamination in the Oriente.  
 
The Consequences of Texaco’s Actions 
Because Texaco was not monitored or regulated in their drilling practices, they admittedly 
did not keep to the same standards that they would have had they been drilling for oil in Texas.154 
The biggest example of this is the fact that they did not line their pits with titanium as they would 
have if they were keeping to their normal business practices.155 More than 300 pits should have 
been lined with titanium in order to prevent leakage; instead toxins from oil waste seeped into the 
ground, poisoning the plants, animals, and groundwater that trickles into the foliage.156  
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(Left) Figure 5: Native Frogs Live Covered in Oil as a result of the pollution.157 
(Right) Figure 6: An oil pit. The yellow tape reads “Peligro” or “Danger”.158 
 
 As a result of these practices, the oil seeped into the water supply. Texaco also burned the 
oil waste “without temperature or emissions controls,”159 resulting in air pollution. 160 The area 
began to smell of gasoline and fumes, and people began to get sick. The oil giant “chose to use 
illegal environmental practices that contaminated the Amazon waterways and harmed many of the 
30,000 people who depend on the tainted waters for drinking, cooking, bathing, cleaning, and 
fishing.”161 
As Texaco provided more and more jobs, communities grew around the pollution, “not 
realizing how [the proximity to oil] would affect [their] health.”162 People built their houses in 
between open, unlined pits, and on top of ones that had been covered. Small villages engulfed the 
pits. When it rained, “greasy black fluid would run from the former pits into the nearby streams… 
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the same streams from which [families] drew their water for drinking and cooking.”163 The locals 
called the rivers “black blankets”164 but continued to use them for everyday things; they had “no 
choice… [but to bathe in] water… [that was] shiny with oil.”  
            
(Left) Figure 7: Oil contaminates the rivers in the Amazon.165 
(Right) Figure 8: An indigenous woman washes her laundry in the oil contaminated waters. 166 
 
     
(Left) Figure 9: Florinda Yela, 75, “outside her house which sits above the contaminated oil pit 
left by Texaco (now Chevron) near Lago Agrio, Ecuador.”167 
(Right) Figure 10: Abandoned Barrels with the Texaco Logo in the Oriente168 
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There are many allegations of indigenous people, particularly children and the elderly, that 
have developed cancer as a result of the pollution.169 There are also claims of women having 
miscarriages and becoming infertile due to consuming this water and living in these conditions.170 
These reports, unfortunately, like every other aspect of this case, are hotly contested and mirrored 
in a cloak of obscurity.171 Although there are many books, articles, and videos that report stories 
from the indigenous people that developed a variety of maladies, no formal evidence was 
submitted to the court confirming a link to cancer from oil pollution.172 Many of these people were 
not even seen by a doctor to confirm their illnesses, as many did not have the means to travel to a 
hospital.173  It is, however, difficult to disregard the “billions of gallons of untreated toxic waste, 
gas, and oil released into the environment, [and the] increasing rate of disease in the Amazon as a 
coincidence.”174 
 
PetroEcuador’s Operations 
 Texaco, however, had long since left and forgotten the country by the time these claims 
came to a court of law. After they could not agree to the terms of an extension to their contract 
with the government of Ecuador, they passed their torch to PetroEcuador, a state-owned oil 
company that they spearheaded; Texaco “created” the state-owned oil company specifically to run 
operations with .175 Although they technically had a partnership for many years, “Texaco was the 
‘operator,’ meaning it managed all activities… [and because] Ecuador’s government [at that time] 
                                               
169 60 Minutes supra note 161, Crude supra note 30. 
170 Id. 
171 See generally 60 Minutes supra note 161, Crude supra note 30, Romero supra note 99, Barrett supra note 1. 
172 Barrett supra note 1 at 210. 
173 Id. 
174 Vasquez supra note 157, see also Sociedad de Lucha contra el Cáncer. Cáncer en regiones del Ecuador. Quito, 
Ecuador: SOLCA, 2001. 
175 Vasquez supra note 157, see also Sociedad de Lucha contra el Cáncer. Cáncer en regiones del Ecuador. Quito, 
Ecuador: SOLCA, 2001. 
 46 
had almost no expertise in the oil industry it rarely questioned anything Texaco did.”176  Texaco 
not only set the standards for PetroEcuador’s operations, their standards did not include 
environmental or human health protections; Texaco left the Ecuadorian personnel in the dark about 
environmental matters and safety issues. In fact, “oil field workers who were trained by Texaco 
were so unaware of the hazards of crude oil during the 1970s and 1980s that they applied it to their 
heads to prevent balding. They sat in the sun or covered their hair with plastic caps overnight. To 
remove the crude, they washed their hair with diesel.”177 In fact, there were many rumors 
“attributing medicinal qualities to Amazon crude,” which, “considering its status at that time as 
the harbinger of a great future for the nation and Texaco's neglect of environmental and human 
health concerns… was not entirely surprising.”178 Unfortunately, the opposite appears to be true. 
By the time Texaco vacated Ecuador in 1992, the government had gained some industry 
experience as Texaco had sent the new generation of oil engineers to the U.S. for training.179 
Unfortunately, “PetroEcuador was not much better than its American godfather.”180 Rather than 
“investing in better technology and safer practices… the company cut corners as much as Texaco 
did.”181 The government was billions of dollars in debt, largely thanks to loans it took out believing 
that they would be able to pay them off with oil money, so a rapid profit was prioritized over 
safety. When natural disasters and other unpredictable environmental issues occurred, the 
government became unable to meet those payments. The government “needed every penny it could 
squeeze from its oil company… to pay off foreign debts and fund usual government operations.”182 
As a result, PetroEcuador does not fall far from Texaco’s tree.  
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In 2003, SOTE gained a twin, which continues to transport 500,000 barrels of oil every 
day to the coast of Ecuador; ironically “the largest portion of exports go to California,” home of 
Chevron.183  The pipelines are “akin to aortas connected to a network of steel veins that move oil 
from the wells and processing stations spread over the humid flatlands.”184 As the indigenous 
communities grew, they engulfed both the old Texaco pipelines and the new PetroEcuador 
pipelines. Unfortunately, this means that the pipelines are not located “underground or routed away 
from roads and people.” Instead, they “rest on rickety pylons one or two feet high and just a few 
feet—or sometimes inches—from the roads.”185 People swerving into these pipes cause accidents 
“all the time,” although “collisions are not necessary to create spills, because the pipelines are old 
and poorly maintained, [so] they leak constantly.”186  
   
      
 
(Left) Figure 11: Children walk along the pipelines to walk places in their towns.187 
(Right) Figure 12: SOTE provides an unfortunate laundry line.188 
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The Oriente Now 
The fact that Texaco caused severe environmental damage is not contested.189 Even Judge 
Kaplan noted that: 
The [U.S. District] Court assumes that there is pollution in the Oriente. On that 
assumption, Texaco and perhaps even Chevron – though it never drilled for oil in Ecuador 
– might bear some responsibility. In any case, improvement of conditions for the residents 
of the Oriente appears to be both desirable and overdue.190  
 
This goes far “beyond anything Chevron would admit,” but is the reality.191 Donziger 
described what he saw on his first visit to the Oriente in 1993 as an “apocalyptic disaster in the 
rainforest.”192 The indigenous people of the Oriente continue to survive in this disaster zone. They 
continue watch how this affects their communities and continue to wait for a judgment. There are 
still hundreds of pits of oil waste left by Texaco, which leak horrible toxins into the environment.193   
The members of this community have, quite literally, grown up in the pollution, and have adapted 
ways to live. Maria Aguinda became the lead plaintiff because Donziger was horrified at the way 
that she “cleaned the oil [that coated her] feet with gasoline-soaked rags.”194 She is a representation 
of the thousands of people who have adapted to an inhospitable area. The headache inducing smell 
of oil and gasoline in these communities is a way of life here, as the area is covered in oil from the 
pipes and waste from the pits.195  Without a major cleanup, there is no end in sight for this pollution. 
Oil does not just dissipate over time. Oil has a “strange property… [one] may hastily bury it in the 
ground, but it does not disappear. Two things can happen. It may sink deeper, poisoning the 
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groundwater, or it may rise to the surface, poisoning the water there. Or it may do both. We may 
wish to forget about oil, but oil will not let us.”196 
 
 
Figure 13: In some places, the oil has permeated the ground, causing people who step in it to 
sink.197 
 
The longer that lawyers argue in foreign courts about the enforcement of a judgment, the longer 
the members of this community are forced to wait for the day that their lands are cleaned up so 
they can live a healthy lifestyle. The drawn-out litigation “ha[s] yet to improve either the ecology 
of the jungle or the health of its inhabitants… the spongy gunk remain[s] everywhere.”198  Maria 
Aguinda “was in her late teens when Texaco began its operations in the Oriente. She is, as of 
[2019], in her late sixties.”199 Time is passing, nothing is happening, and the indigenous people of 
the Oriente have no choice but to wait. 
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Steven Donziger: The Man, the Myth, the Legend 
“This case is not about me… the communities are not going away, they’re resilient, the lawyers 
are not going away, they’re resilient, and we are going to continue to fight this battle until that 
judgment is collected and the people get what they deserve, which is their lands cleaned up, as 
well as compensation for all the damage that they have had to endure and suffer through for 
decades. They deserve that, and that’s what they are going to get.”200 – Steven Donziger 
 
 
Figure 14: Steven Donziger in Ecuador.201 
 The first thing one reads about Steven Donziger is his height. This is affirmed by the dozens 
of pictures of him towering over the indigenous people he defends in court. The second thing 
people notice is his charismatic nature, of which I can attest to; when I talked to him on the phone 
in January of 2019, I noticed this immediately. Without question, Donziger could convince a man 
on a typical day in Southern Arizona that he needed an umbrella. He is knowledgeable, persuasive, 
and quick on his feet: the walking, talking definition of zealous advocacy for his clients.  
Donziger became the face of this massive case almost immediately out of Harvard Law 
School, where he graduated with former U.S. President Barack Obama. Before law school, he was 
an investigative journalist that spent years in Latin America. He ability to summon “righteous 
fury… seemingly at will”202 in support of his clients earned him the reputation of a “performance 
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artist with a law degree”203 and “Herculean tenacity.”204 Many are not quite sure “whether he [is] 
a missionary or a masochist… or both.”205 His “guerilla warfare” style of law means he is willing 
to go to any length for his clients, something Texaco highly underestimated.206 
With being the front man of the case comes many responsibilities; unfortunately for 
Donziger, those include being Chevron’s punching bag. He talks in many interviews about how 
although he is “a very resilient person... [he is] being attacked by a major American oil company 
that is trying to destroy [his] life.”207 Donziger says that Chevron “created a caricature around me” 
for the media and proceeded to “attack” it.208 He argues that they “needed a human face to distract 
from the people in Ecuador that they are killing.”209 Even major news outlets have acknowledged 
the “Demonize Donziger” strategy of avoiding corporate liability.210 He acknowledges this as a 
“intelligent, clever, albeit disgusting strategy.”211  
He is not wrong; Chevron has openly admitted that they are using many strategies to fight 
off the judgment not only for this case, but also from potential others.212 Former Chevron VP stated 
that there is a docket of “lots of people who have brought lots of lawsuits against Chevron who all 
believe, ‘you’ve got a lot of money… why don’t you just give me some?”213  By admitting their 
wrongdoing in the Amazon, they are opening the door for liabilities in the dozens of other countries 
they operate in.214 In fact, this was a part of Donziger’s master plan: a model of sorts for holding 
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large corporations who do wrong in third world countries responsible for their actions. He knows 
that: 
“one of the reasons Chevron is fighting so hard is they know if the indigenous people of 
Ecuador get a monetary recovery…if they actually get the money, it will inspire people all 
over the world who were victimized by this company and by other oil and mining 
companies who suffer the effects of pollution…it will encourage them to use the same 
model we did to get a recovery… Chevron is fighting really hard to kill off not only this 
lawsuit but the idea behind the lawsuit.”215 
Unfortunately for Donziger, Chevron was preparing a model of their own, as they hoped the case 
would serve “as an example of how companies can fight back if they have the nerve and the 
cash.”216   
Chevron was not going down without a fight, but neither was Donziger. If anything, 
Chevron’s model has emboldened him to use a wide variety of legal strategies in order to gain both 
political and media favor. He argued that the plaintiffs could “have the best proof in the world, and 
if we don’t have a political plan, we will surely lose.”217 As a result, Donziger can describe the 
“dirty tricks, outright lies, intimidation employed by Chevron to evade justice in Ecuador and to 
sabotage the trial” with the drop of a hat. He has argued the same script for over 25 years. 
Donziger is facing more heat than he ever expected; between the RICO case and his license 
to practice law being suspended, he could be in a lot of hot water. He argues that the RICO case 
was “inherently illegitimate” and that [he has] not been properly protected by the justice 
system.”218 He believes he is facing “the most vicious, well-funded retaliation campaign ever to 
destroy [him].”219 This campaign includes “weaponizing the bar association” against him, even 
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though he “has not had a client complain in 25 years” and 220 filing lawsuit after lawsuit because 
“they know [he does not have] the money to defend [himself].221 
Donziger knows a case like this is unprecedented in many ways. The Ecuadorian case “is 
probably one of the most intensely litigated environmental cases in the world,” Donziger stated. 
He also acknowledges that there are certain exceptions to traditional legal practicum when it comes 
to this litigation, what he calls the “Chevron or Steven Donziger exception to the law.”222 He argues 
that “the law is not obeyed when it comes to me or Chevron.”223 
Donziger has no shame in saying what he thinks and calling things out the way he sees 
them, although he admits he has “involved views because [he has] been living this for so many 
years.”224 According to him, this entire case is a “corporate scandal that reaches into upper 
echelons of judiciary and New York corporate world.”225 He also states that “Chevron’s rage at 
[him] appears to have left it entirely unhinged, living in a fantasy world — and one with a terrifying 
lack of due process.”226   He argues that “when it comes to corporate power issues and fighting 
this judgment that came out of Ecuador, they do not follow the law, [decisions are] political to the 
extreme.”227 He claims Judge Kaplan has a bias toward Chevron because they are a large American 
corporation, and he was a Clinton appointee.228 In fact, he states that “judges in America, no matter 
their political opinion… [have] virtually no disagreement about economic issues, particularly ones 
when you have a small country imposing a multi-billion dollar judgment on an American oil 
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company.”229 He asserts that the “global judicial system is rigged to favor wealth and power 
generally” and that Chevron’s extreme manipulation tactics, “are [all issues] being raised to delay 
[the inevitable] day of reckoning.”230 
Ultimately, Donziger believes this case is a representation of the “failure of civil justice 
system, because it has taken 25 years with no solution.”231 He states there have been “over 150 
judges in Ecuador, Canada, in the US, who have overseen some aspect of this case without there 
being a final decision. That is a total insult to the indigenous people of Ecuador.”232 They describe 
the litigation as “Chevron abusing the process because they [have] determined it’s cheaper to pay 
millions and millions of dollars to lawyers to delay the case than to pay the people they harmed 
for clean up.” He states there is still “a tremendous amount of enthusiasm” amongst the people in 
Ecuador, and that they will continue to pursue this judgment;233 “Ecuador won’t surrender to 
Chevron which is why Chevron keeps attacking.” 234 
The Dark Side of Donziger 
While Donziger is, without question, a zealous advocate for his Ecuadorian indigenous 
clients, much of his behavior throughout the litigation has caused an uproar through the 
international legal community. To begin, as a non-Ecuadorian, Donziger is not even allowed to 
practice law in the country of Ecuador; but “technicalities did not deter Donziger…[he] cited no 
statute or precedent, [only] his own ferocious indignation” in chambers or in a courtroom in Lago 
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Agrio.235 He also chose not to sue the Ecuadorian government or PetroEcuador, preferring the 
story of a large American corporation versus villagers in Ecuador, a decision Texaco, and 
subsequently Chevron, has questioned since the beginning of the case.236 Further, none of the 
indigenous people were properly evaluated by a doctor, nor was there evidence entered into the 
record on the effects of oil pollution on health, either generally or to specific cases in Ecuador.237 
All evidence was anecdotal rather than scientific, which left many wondering how valid the claims 
of oil causing cancer was.238 What did Donziger not want on the record and why would he not 
make sure this sort of evidence was heard? 
Donziger’s fishy legal choices have been documented through video evidence in the Crude 
outtakes, and subsequently through evidence on the record. The discovery of the outtakes led to 
“numerous scenes showing Steven Donziger and other members of the plaintiffs' legal team 
engag[ing] in ethically questionable behavior that further compromised the integrity of the 
Ecuadorean proceedings.”239	Judge Kaplan outlined this behavior, which included: 
“coded emails among Donziger and his colleagues describing their private interactions 
with and machinations directed at judges and a court-appointed expert, their payments to a 
supposedly neutral expert out of a secret account, a lawyer who invited a film crew to 
innumerable private strategy meetings and even to ex parte meetings with judges, an 
Ecuadorian judge who claims to have written the multibillion-dollar decision but who was 
so inexperienced and uncomfortable with civil cases that he had someone else (a former 
judge who had been removed from the bench) draft some civil decisions for him, an 18-
year-old typist who supposedly did Internet research in American, English, and French law 
for the same judge, who knew only Spanish, and much more.240 
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More and more evidence was uncovered as Donziger’s RICO trial progressed. Among the most  
abhorrent was the affidavit of former Ecuadorean judge Alberto Guerra, who presided over the 
Lago Agrio case between 2003 and 2004.241 In his affidavit, he “made grave allegations of 
corruption that involved him, the plaintiffs' counsel, and his successor Honorable Nicolás 
Zambrano, who was in charge of the Superior Court of Nueva Loja when the final decision of the 
case was issued.”242 He described in great detail how he was the ghostwriter for all decisions issued 
by Judge Zambrano in the Lago Agrio case; “he also explained how he had helped the plaintiffs' 
counsel to move the case forward, and how he had received a monthly stipend in exchange for his 
illegal work, which included editing the final judgment against Chevron.”243  
The evidence uncovered about Cabrera’s report was not better. Judge Kaplan found that 
the plaintiffs attorneys’: 
“coerced one judge, first to use a court-appointed, supposedly impartial, “global expert” 
to make an overall damages assessment and, then, to appoint to that important role a man 
whom Donziger hand-picked and paid to ‘totally play ball’ with the LAPs [Lago Agrio 
Plaintiffs]. They then paid a Colorado consulting firm [Stratus] secretly to write all or most 
of the global expert's report, falsely presented the report as the work of the court-
appointed and supposedly impartial expert, and told half-truths or worse to U.S. courts in 
attempts to prevent exposure of that and other wrongdoing. Ultimately, the LAP team wrote 
the Lago Agrio court's Judgment themselves and promised $500,000 to the Ecuadorian 
judge to rule in their favor and sign their judgment. If ever there were a case warranting 
equitable relief with respect to a judgment procured by fraud, this is it.”244 
These corrupt actions taint the Ecuadorian judgment, much like oil pollutes and permeates through 
the groundwater in Lago Agrio. When reviewed by the 2nd Circuit, Judge Kearse stated “the record 
reveal[ed] ‘a parade of corrupt actions’ by Donziger and his associates, including coercion and 
                                               
241 Gomez supra note 63 at 438. See also Declaration of Alberto Guerra Bastidas at PP 23-27, Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013), ECF No. 746-3 (Ex. C). 
242 Gomez supra note 63 at 438. See also Declaration of Alberto Guerra Bastidas at PP 23-27, Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013), ECF No. 746-3 (Ex. C). 
243 Gomez supra note 63 at 438. See also Declaration of Alberto Guerra Bastidas at PP 23-27, Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013), ECF No. 746-3 (Ex. C). 
244 Todd supra note 239. 
 57 
fraud, culminating in the bribe offer.”245 She continued by declaring that “Chevron's $8.646 billion 
judgment debt ... is clearly traceable to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs' legal team's corrupt conduct.”246  
This conduct has prevented the plaintiffs from pursing their judgment in the U.S. and has resulted 
in the loss of Donziger’s law license. Again, this does not deter Donziger from fighting for 
enforcement. Although right now Donziger’s tenacity is on the right side of the human rights’ 
fence, if the Lago court had ruled for Chevron, Donziger would still, without question, be fighting 
for his judgment. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE MEDIA FRENZY… FAKE NEWS? 
Introduction 
Throughout the decades of litigation involving this case has been a swarm of media 
headlines, ranging from newspaper articles, magazine spreads, and websites, to celebrity coverage 
and multiple books and documentaries. This case has been covered by the likes of 60 Minutes, 
Vanity Fair, The New York Times, Forbes, and many, many more. There have been countless 
books, articles, and even a documentary, Crude, that followed the case during the Ecuadorian legal 
proceedings. Celebrities from all over the world have taken an interest in the environmental 
damage in the Oriente. Even Brad Pitt and George Clooney have fought over the rights of who 
would get to produce a movie based on this case.247 It should come as “no surprise [then] that the 
Chevron-Ecuador saga has garnered the worldwide attention of [not only] the media,” but also 
academic literature.248 There have been “numerous reports, newspaper articles and documentaries 
[which] have been published around the world since the beginnings of the case in the early 
nineties.”249 
The media is inherently intertwined with this case, and it, unfortunately, yet predictably, 
changes its tune at the drop of a hat. The media seems to agree with Donziger and the plaintiffs' 
lawyers one minute, and with the following 'wave of judgments, agree with Chevron the next. The 
media frenzy is inherently intertwined with the lawyers’ legal strategies to involve them, and as 
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such, the media has played a crucial role in highlighting aspects of this case that the subsequent 
attorneys wanted to be highlighted. 
Media & Legal Strategy: ChevronToxico & The Amazon Post 
An inherent part of the media strategies of each side are the party-run campaigns running 
propaganda against their opponents. The reach of this propaganda has slowly grown from press 
releases and interviews to websites, Twitter, and YouTube videos. These play an inherent role in 
how the media and the public perceive the case and are updated regularly any time there is news 
relevant to the case. 
The plaintiffs’ control the cleverly named ChevronToxico website to propagate anti-
Chevron articles into the media.250 Subtitled the Campaign for Justice in Ecuador,”251 the website 
outlines “the true story of Chevron’s Ecuador disaster.”252 There, you can find hundreds of stories, 
pictures, and videos substantiating the plaintiffs’ claims and denouncing Chevron in every way 
possible. This website actually started as TexacoToxico, and transitioned to ChevroninEcuador, 
and eventually ChevronToxico when the 2001 merger occurred.  
Some other websites, like Amazon Watch and the Corporate Social Responsibility Wire, 
also regularly contribute to this campaign.253 Amazon Watch in particular has created a five-part 
animated series on Chevron entitled The Adventures of Donny Rico, where they point out what 
they believe are the obvious flaws in the case by asking the character, a New York mobster like 
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the ones RICO were meant to prosecute.254 Using expletives and a thick New York accent, Donny 
Rico explains how “Chevron makes it a crime to defend the environment”255 and how “if you’re a 
big corporation… [you] can make certain problems go away… [by] being the victim.”256 The series 
also animates Judge Kaplan in cahoots with Donny Rico; the two cheekily state that they have “got 
just the ‘ting for a big corporation [that has] got problems with pollution, spills, [and] hazardous 
gloop… RICO their a**es.”257 
 
Figure 15: Donny Rico, a character the plaintiffs created. His New York accent is supposed to 
represent corrupt corporations in the U.S. He “doesn’t like what you’re insuinatin’, pal.”258 
 
 Not to be outdone by Donziger, Chevron its own propaganda campaign. Between the 
Chevron-run website The Amazon Post, subtitled “Chevron’s Views and Opinions on The Ecuador 
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Lawsuit”259, their company press releases, and their own YouTube videos, Chevron has an equally 
detailed account of the events in Ecuador from their perspective. The Amazon Post has edited over 
outtakes from Crude and called the videos catchy names, like “‘The Legal Fraud of the Century’ 
in 3 Minutes”260 and “Confessions of a Fraud,” starring Steven Donziger.261 They even examine 
the plaintiffs’ evidence, calling it “science fiction.”262 
 
Figure 16: A Still from The Amazon Post’s “‘The Legal Fraud of the Century’ in 3 Minutes.” 
Donziger, middle, is quoted saying “Facts do not exist. Facts are created.”263 
Both the plaintiffs’ and Chevron’s websites are integral in generating media hype and circulating 
fake news to the public in an effort to garner support for their case. Ironically, both accuse the 
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others of misleading the courts and the public through the media; the mismanaged of this case has 
led to a media-based arms race with mutually assured destruction as the likely outcome. 
Toxic Tours 
“I wish Judge Kaplan could take a toxic tour. Then he would see the real Chevron… it would 
change his mind.” – Donald Moncayo264 
 
 The media has played such an integral role in the span of the litigation that the plaintiffs’ 
and defense lawyers have set up their own “toxic tours” for journalists or celebrities coming to 
document the woes of the Oriente firsthand. These tours differ drastically, depending on which 
team is taking you around. In fact, perhaps the only things these “tours” have in common are the 
method of transportation, a 4x4 in the middle of the jungle, and the humid Amazonian air.  
Donziger and his Ecuadorian associates, who have toured around celebrities like Brad Pitt, 
Angelina Jolie, Sting, and many more, have planned stops at the worst pits265. A few journalists 
and celebrities documented an indigenous marketplace full of trinkets and souvenirs, seemingly 
set up exclusively for their visit. There are pavilions of people who have been trained to talk about 
the horrors Texaco put them through. “Tourists” listen to the translator tell their stories while 
looking at pictures of babies with birth defects and cancer patients. Normally there are lots of 
cameras who follow the celebrity participants. Journalists and celebrities who write articles and 
make statements are told to “try to mention the word Texaco as much as possible.”266 
 And it’s not just Western celebrities posing for Instagram. The most important tour of all 
was given to former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa (2007-2017). In 2014, during the middle 
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of the Ecuadorian litigation,  he dipped his gloved hand in oil, and solemnly demonstrated the 
“dirty hand of Chevron” to the hundreds of press members and the thousands following the 
coverage around the world.267 By proclaiming it “one of humanity’s most serious disasters … far 
greater than either the Exxon Valdez Alaska oil spill or the Mexican Gulf BP spill,” all with the 
symbolic black hand raised, he made it obvious that the whole weight of the Ecuadorian 
government was behind Donziger and his associates.268 
  
 
(Left) Figure 17: Plaintiffs’ lawyer Pablo Fajardo leads a Toxic Tour. Fajardo went to law school 
with the intention of helping fight the case in Ecuador, as he is from the Oriente region. His 
activism led to him winning countless human rights’ awards.269 
(Right) Figure 18: President Rafael Correa, “Anybody can come here to the Ecuadorean Amazon 
and dip their own hands in the lagoons of oil left by Texaco more than 20 years ago and their hands 
will come out full of oil.”270 
 
The gloved hand dipped in oil had been used as a symbol by the plaintiffs’ lawyers in media 
advertising long before President Correa came to the Oriente, and to have it adopted by the 
Ecuadorian president sparked an international campaign, which is now utilized by celebrities, 
journalists, and other important figureheads anytime they are in the Oriente. The “Dirty Hand 
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International Campaign” was now an integral part of any toxic tour, and in turn, any news article, 
press release, or footage of Ecuador made copious use of the symbol.271 The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
goal of publicizing the pollution in Ecuador is furthered any time one of these pictures is posted, 
tweeted, shared, or liked.272 
        
(Left)Figure 19: President Rafael Correa on his visit the Oriente in 2014.273        
(Right) Figure 20: Actress Mia Farrow on a visit to the Oriente in 2014.274 
 
         
(Left) Figure 21: Rene Santos, vocalist of Puerto Rican band Calle 13, on his visit in 2014.275  
(Right) Figure 22: Activist and environmentalist Donald Moncayo in 2011.276 
 
 
 
                                               
271Garcia supra note 149, Kings supra note 266. 
272 Garcia supra note 149. 
273 Phelim McAleer, Mia Farrow’s dirty profits—a hidden payoff in corrupt Ecuador trial, N.Y. Post (Oct. 5, 2014) 
 https://nypost.com/2014/10/05/mia-farrows-dirty-profits-a-hidden-payoff-in-corrupt-ecuador-trial/ 
274 Garcia supra note 149. 
275 UPI Staff, Ecuador to clean up decades-old Amazon oil pollution, United Press International (Mar. 19, 2019) 
https://www.upi.com/Ecuador-to-start-cleanup-of-decades-old-Amazon-oil-pollution/5931551893715/. 
276 El País, Chevron loses US battle to block Ecuadorian judgment (Oct 11, 2012) 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2012/10/11/inenglish/1349962505_709885.html?rel=mas. 
 65 
 
 
 
       
(Left) Figure 23: Actress Darryl Hannah in 2007.277 
(Right) Figure 24: Actor Danny Glover in 2013.278 
 
Chevron combats this publicity with its own version of the toxic tour, showing the work 
Texaco put in to “clean up the countryside” and, in turn, villainizing the state owned PetroEcuador. 
Instead of taking the visitors to the worst locations, they logically visit the cleanest, showing places 
that have been repaired through the millions of dollars they remind each visitor Texaco spent on 
remediation.279 They took their visitors to farms, showcasing the healthy vegetation and animals.280 
There is not an indigenous community member or a camera in sight.281 
Crude 
“When I go to fill up my gas tank with cheap and abundant gasoline in [the U.S.], someone is 
paying a price for that.” – Joe Berlinger, Director of the award-winning documentary Crude.282 
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Outside of the party’s own propaganda, there have been a myriad of articles, interviews, 
pictures, and videos; most notably is the 2009 documentary Crude. The film follows Donziger, his 
associates, and the people of Lago Agrio through the discovery portion of Aguinda II in Ecuador. 
Crude is a great introduction to the people of Lago Agrio; we can see people crowding in barren 
rooms in the Amazon to talk about how this pollution has impacted their lives. Many say they did 
not know it would hurt them. Person after person talks about their family members who have died 
of cancer. The pollution has impacted every aspect of their lives. No matter what one thinks of 
Steven Donziger or Chevron, the footage is haunting. 
 
Figure 25: The poster for the movie Crude.283 The New York Times called it “The Silent Spring 
of Ecuador’s Increasingly Aggressive Environmental Movement.”284 
Crude premiered at the renowned Sundance Film Festival and went on to win a subsequent 
fourteen awards across different film festivals. When asked why he made Crude, director Joe 
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Berlinger responded that “it occurred to [him] that white people have treated indigenous people 
abysmally for the last 700 years,” citing everything from the Spanish conquistadors to the way the 
U.S. was formed by “wip[ing] out the indigenous population[s].”285 He went on further to explain 
that “multinational corporations…particularly in the extractive industries, in the third world, in 
places like the rainforests of Ecuador… [are] the modern day continuation of this terrible treatment 
of indigenous people.”286 He stated that: 
“We are eradicating the very people who we should be cherishing. We’re at a very unique 
time in our history… where we all are aware of the environment being out of balance, 
we’re aware that we need to figure out how to live in harmony with nature, and at the same 
time we should be cherishing the people and harvesting the knowledge of people who know 
how to tread lightly on the Earth, which are the indigenous people, and yet we have been 
engaged in a cultural genocide of these people for the past six centuries.”287 
Berlinger claims the film “does not really take a position in the lawsuit… because [he is] 
not a judge, or a lawyer, or a scientist.”288 For him, the focus is on the original damage and 
extraction of oil, as he argues “there is no moral justification for what was done.”289 The biggest 
crime he sees is that “this area… [was] opened up for oil exploration without taking the local 
population into account.”290 He, unfortunately, is not wrong; the indigenous people of that region 
during the 1960s did not have the rights to their land.291 
Chevron in Crude 
“In the United States we used to say how much pollution can we clean up? And now, what we 
ask ourselves is how much pollution do we need to clean up for this to be safe for human health.” 
-Sara McMillan, Chevron’s Chief Environmental Scientist in the 2009 Documentary Crude.292 
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Crude makes mincemeat of Chevron. Quoting McMillan while flashing pictures of the 
environmental degradation and the indigenous population, Crude shows the ludicrous parallel 
between a company that denies damage of any kind, and the people who live and experience the 
results of their stubbornness. “We do know that skin rashes are certainly an issue in the region…” 
McMillan stumbles to get her words precise and neutral. She continues: “we believe those are due 
to the fact that there is no sewage treatment anywhere in the area. There is an enormous amount 
of fecal bacteria in the water… this is not good water to drink or bathe in but for the most part it 
has nothing to do with oil, it has to do with poor sanitation.”293 She argues that the science behind 
what is going on in the Amazon is bad, and that “the public may tend to think if you see something 
in the environment it must mean that it [is] very bad,” but in reality we are exposed to some of 
those same toxins every day. Kent Robinson, a spokesperson for Chevron argues that the plaintiffs 
“have turned a blind eye for 17 years to PetroEcuador. We would argue that they are doing more 
damage in Ecuador than Texaco has ever.” 294 
The Crude Outtakes  
 
Steven Donziger: “You can never underestimate the power of personal relationships in this 
business.”  
Cameraman: “What business is that?”  
Donziger answers, smiling. “The business of getting press coverage as part of a legal strategy.” 
He pauses. “The business of plaintiffs’ law. To make f***ing money.”— the outtakes of 
Crude.295 
 
While the documentary itself eviscerated Chevron’s “good name”, it came with a silver 
lining. In a bit of a fishing expedition for their multiple cases against Donziger, Chevron 
                                               
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 1:40:00 
295 The Amazon Post, Donziger: 'To Make F**king Money'--Crude Film Outtake (Jan. 20, 2011) available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-UWOzCycdg8 
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subpoenaed footage that did not make it into the final documentary, based on somewhat dubious 
legal grounds.296  The Crude outtakes were every bit as damning as Chevron predicted. The footage 
showed, “with unflattering frankness, inappropriate, unethical and perhaps illegal conduct.”297 
Scene after scene of the raw footage depicted: 
“plaintiffs’ counsel meeting with a member of the team of court-appointed damages experts 
who were supposed to be neutral, plaintiffs’ lawyers engaging in self-professed ‘pressure 
tactics’ to persuade a judge to block inspection of a laboratory being used by plaintiffs, and 
meeting with the President of Ecuador. [Chevron] argued that these scenes supported their 
[PCA] claim[s] that the raw footage would demonstrate that the court-appointed expert was 
biased toward plaintiffs and that the Ecuadorian government and judicial system had been 
improperly influenced by plaintiffs.”298 
The release of this footage sent “shockwaves through the nation’s legal communities,”299 and has 
continued to impact litigation on U.S. and foreign soil. Despite the judgment in Ecuador, courts in 
the U.S. have determined that “what has blatantly occurred in this matter would in fact be 
considered fraud by any court” and “if such conduct does not amount to fraud in a particular 
country, then that country has larger problems than an oil spill.”300 
Conclusion 
We live in an era of fake news, and this litigation is no exception to that rule.  The myriad 
of truths, half-truths, and outright lies the two parties have flooded the airwaves and courtrooms 
                                               
296 See infra:  The Outtakes: Coming to a §1782 claim near you 
297 CIVIL NO. 10-MC-21JH/LFG, CIVIL NO. 10-MC-22 JH/LFG. (D.N.M. Sep. 1, 2010). See also Scott Edelman 
et. al, Obtaining U.S. Discovery to Litigate in Foreign or International Tribunals Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 
Gibson Dunn, https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/WebcastSlides-
Transnational-Litigation-01.29.2015.pdf 
298 Edward M. Spiro & Judith L. Mogul, U.S. DISCOVERY IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS: SECTION §1782 AND CHEVRON 
IN ECUADOR, 244 N.Y.L.J. 25 (Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/2010-08-05-u-s-
discovery-in-foreign-proceedings-section-1782-and-chevron-in-
ecuador/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/070081010Morvillo.pdf. 
299 2010 WL 3418394, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010). See also Edelman et. al supra note 297. 
300 W.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2010. 
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with have made it nearly impossible to believe anything about this case. The media frenzy 
surrounding the litigation has played a crucial role in the legal strategy of the plaintiffs and of 
Chevron. Entire websites and social media pages are created by attorneys to distract and attack the 
opposing party. Toxic tours were created to show people the damage in the Amazon, and they are 
manipulated to make the opposing party look as bad as possible. Even the documentary Crude 
portrays both the plaintiffs and Chevron in a bad light, highlighting the cutthroat nature of court 
tactics behind the litigation. The websites, social media, news articles, documentaries, and even in 
person tours work together in furthering the case outside of the courtroom by reaching the public, 
who in turn raise awareness and place political pressure on their representatives. When litigation 
lasts for this long, the only way to stay relevant is through the media.  Sometimes the court of 
public opinion reigns supreme. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LESSONS LEARNED 
“By looking at the parties' constant effort to maintain their fight in multiple fronts, one can easily 
characterize the Chevron-Ecuador saga as the judicial version of a Hydra, the mythical monster 
with the body of a serpent and many heads that could never be harmed, and which severed heads 
would grow back endless times. Like in the legend of the Hydra, the Chevron-Ecuador case not 
only resists going away, but also and seems to grow more every day.”301 – Manuel Gomez 
 
Introduction  
 In November, the Aguinda case will celebrate its 26th birthday, although there is not much 
to celebrate. Donziger has no license to practice law and is facing sanctions, Chevron is spending 
millions of dollars on legal fees,302 and, most importantly, the people of the Oriente are still living 
in a toxic wasteland. In order to create some sort of silver lining, this chapter will outline ways in 
which U.S. law can learn from this massive transnational lawsuit. It will consider both the effects 
on the plaintiffs, but also the defendants Chevron, if such laws were to be implemented. 
Specifically, this chapter will discuss: (1) the incorrect forum non conveniens dismissal in Aguinda 
I, and the need to hear cases with legitimate evidence of corruption rendered after forum non 
conveniens dismissals, (2) the need to broaden the current restrictions for when federal courts can 
hear Alien Tort Statute cases, (3) the growing trend in international business toward arbitration, 
how the tribunal erred in re-litigating the case, and how tribunals must be more diligent in 
                                               
301 Gomez supra note 63 at 432. 
302 Again, this number is highly contested. As of 2014, Chevron was pursing a $32.3 million dollar judgment to 
cover their legal fees. See Nate Raymond, Chevron seeks $32 million in legal fees in Ecuador case, Reuters (Mar. 
14, 2014),  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chevron-ecuador/chevron-seeks-32-million-in-legal-fees-in-ecuador-
case-idUSBREA2I1PS20140319. In the RICO case, Chevron won $800,000 in attorneys’ fees from Donziger. See 
Michael I . Krauss, The Ecuador Saga Continues: Steven Donziger now owes Chevron more than $800,000, Forbes 
(Mar. 14, 2018) https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkrauss/2018/03/14/the-ecuador-saga-contiues-steven-
donziger-now-owes-chevron-more-than-800000/#80c3f7f49498. The plaintiffs claim Chevron has spent upwards of 
$2 billion dollars in legal fees for over 60 law firms. See Rex Weyler, Chevron’s SLAPP suit against Ecuadorians: 
corporate intimidation, Greenpeace (May 11, 2018), 
https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/16448/chevrons-slapp-suit-against-ecuadorians-corporate-
intimidation/. 
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investigating whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, (4) the need for a higher standard of review 
in regards to using evidence in a §1782 international discovery claim in U.S. Courts, and (5), the 
need for a federal anti-SLAPP statute. 
Ecuador was an Alternate, But Not an Adequate Forum 
 The S.D.N.Y. court erred in granting a forum non conveniens dismissal in Aguinda I. 
Although Piper Aircraft Co. currently provides that “so long as there was a remedy available in 
the alternate forum, it did not matter if the remedy was clearly insufficient,”303 the Court should 
weigh whether the remedy is adequate and if they are willing to enforce a judgment from the 
alternate forum before dismissing a case on forum non conveniens grounds. 
The court where the case is heard, or the forum, can be crucial to the outcome of the case. 
Different states have different laws, different circuits have different precedents, and the outcome 
of a case can drastically change based on where it is filed. Part of this is political; some courts, by 
the nature of the judges that sit on their benches, tend to lean toward the right or the left. Some 
states, like Delaware, have stricter laws to protect businesses and some states are more willing to 
sympathize with an injured plaintiff.  
The strategic choice of where the plaintiffs’ lawyer chooses to file a civil case is often 
referred to as forum shopping. Forum shopping occurs when certain plaintiffs look for laws or 
judges in states or even other countries that better suit what they are asking for, and subsequently 
file the case there, often without an obvious connection to the location.304 Although generally 
                                               
303 Legal Information Institute, Forum non Conveniens, Cornell Law School 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forum_non_conveniens, See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
304 See Russel J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International Forum Shopping, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463,  
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portrayed in a negative light, a zealous lawyer will think about where they should file their claim 
in order to have the best outcome for their client. 
 Forum non conveniens is a legal mechanism designed to prevent forum shopping and 
ensure cases are heard in the proper forum. Forum non conveniens objections are raised before the 
substantive aspects of the trial starts. Most of the time this is obvious; a Texan defendant and a 
Maryland plaintiff who had an incident occur in New York could file a case in Texas, but it would 
make much more sense to have the case heard in the S.D.N.Y., as this is where the incident 
occurred, where the witnesses would be, and where the evidence is.  
 
The Aguinda I Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Was Improper 
In order to determine whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is proper, the court invokes 
two tests. The first is a balancing test, weighing public and private factors. The private factors 
include, (1) ease of access to evidence, (2) ease of obtaining witnesses, (3) enforceability of 
judgment, (4) interest of the two parties in their connections with the respective forums,  and (5) 
the plaintiff's chosen court would be burdensome to the defendant.305 If a court finds the fifth factor 
to be true, it is sufficient enough to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens.306 
Here, the public factors pulled toward litigation in the U.S. While the access to evidence 
and obtaining witnesses would be more difficult stateside, the plaintiffs chose to file there, 
meaning that their attorneys felt that it was more important the case be heard in the Southern 
District of New York than in Ecuador. Further, the judgment would be able to be enforced, as 
Texaco had assets in the U.S., and Texaco was incorporated, therefore “at home” in the state of 
New York, so it was not burdensome to them. If anything, it was more burdensome for the 
                                               
305 Legal Information Institute supra note 303. 
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plaintiffs, and yet they still chose to file their case in that particular forum. That choice should have 
been respected. 
The public factors also tipped the scales in favor of litigation in the U.S. The four public 
factors included: “(1) whether the trial would involve multiple sets of laws, thus potentially 
confusing a jury, (2) having juries who may have a connection to the case, (3) local interest in 
having local interests heard at home, (4) having the trial in a place where state laws govern.”307  
Here, the plaintiffs wanted to sue under the ATS, which meant they would be applying 
U.S. law to an international incident. If they were to sue in Ecuador, there would be no jury to 
confuse or to have a connection to the case, as only a judge would preside over this litigation. 
There was certainly an interest in having Ecuadorian laws govern a case where Ecuadorian citizens 
were suffering from pollution; the cause of this pollution, however, was an American company, 
who would be punished more thoroughly in the U.S. than in Ecuador. 
Even if the court had determined there were enough factors on both sides to move on to 
the next step, the adequate alternative inquiry test should have kept the litigation in the U.S. This 
test is simple; the defendant must offer an alternate forum, and it “must have the ability to provide 
a remedy to the plaintiff.”308 Here, that was not the case. Class action cases could not be brought 
in Ecuador at the time that this dismissal was being considered; only after the plaintiffs helped 
lobby for a change in Ecuadorian law did the court have an ability to hear the case. Even the 
Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft, the case that clarifies that an adequate forum must have a remedy, 
noted Ecuador as the “single example of an inadequate forum.”309 There, the Court “cited Phoenix 
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309 Howard Erichson, The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute, Forum Non Conveniens, and the Problem of Ex Ante 
Inadequacy, 1 Stan. J. Complex Litig. 417 (2013). 
 75 
Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc,310  [nothing that] the court refuses to dismiss, where alternative 
forum is Ecuador, [as] it is unclear whether Ecuadorean tribunal will hear the case, and there is no 
generally codified Ecuadorean legal remedy for the unjust enrichment and tort claims.311 At the 
time of the dismissal, there was no feasible way for the Ecuadorian courts to provide a remedy, a 
serious oversight by the S.D.N.Y. courts; “this dismissal was widely viewed as Texaco's escape 
from liability.”312  
 
Corruption Concerns 
Even if a judge deemed the case was better suited in Ecuador, the fact that there was a 
question regarding legitimacy of the court system there means the judge had a responsibility to 
make sure the case was properly heard. There were many numerous warning signs that should 
have alerted the judge that Ecuador could be an improper venue. Donziger actually raised this very 
argument in Aguinda I. He claimed “Ecuador’s judicial system was notoriously corrupt, and its 
government relied on oil revenues for a third of its annual budget… politically, there was no way 
that Texaco was going to be held accountable in Ecuador.”313 He noted that “the country did not 
have jury trials, so enormous discretionary power [was] invested in judges, who, for the most part, 
are poorly paid civil servants… [and he] worried that they might be susceptible to bribery.”314 
Further, in the U.S. judicial system, lawyers are cannot meet with a judge outside the presence of 
opposing counsel; “in Ecuador at the time no such rules applied, making it difficult to monitor 
                                               
310  78 F.R.D. 445 (D. Del. 1978). 
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whether a judge had been subjected to improper influence.”315 In another example of brutal irony, 
Donziger now faces charges for this exact sort of conduct.316 
Texaco, however, denied these claims, saying that Ecuador was capable of offering a fair 
trial, and “insisting that the country’s legal norms were ‘similar to those in many European 
nations.’”317 They did, however, contradict this on appeal, where in order to agree to submit to the 
judgment of an Ecuadorian court, they reserved the right to contest to the validity of the courts. 
They only did so after the multibillion-dollar judgment, because their plan was to discourage 
litigation through an inconvenient forum.318  
 
Enforcing Foreign Judgments After Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals 
While the U.S. cannot hear every case under the sun, if there are legitimate concerns of 
corruption in a foreign judgment after a forum non conveniens dismissal, perhaps the U.S. should 
hear the case again on the merits. Forum non conveniens is intended to prevent forum shopping, 
not to decide cases without ever hearing their merits.  When procedural law leads to negative 
substantive effects, there is a problem within the procedure that must be changed. This is the type 
of policy that should be implementing when looking at foreign judgments that have been rendered 
due to a forum non conveniens dismissal.  This case, however, may be unable to be solved through 
different forum non conveniens policy. If Chevron had won in Ecuador, the case would still be 
plagued with corruption and back in U.S. Courts. Donziger would be shouting his same ‘Ecuador 
is corrupt’ argument and Chevron would be reiterating Texaco’s sentiments that the courts are 
fine. With 18 billion dollars is at stake, corruption is a minor concern. 
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316 See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger.  
317 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534,537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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Alien Tort Statute Protections Under the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
 Because the ATS was designed to allow human rights violations to be litigated in U.S. 
federal courts, special protections should be given these cases when the defendants argue for a 
forum non conveniens dismissal. Further, the current framework for if courts can hear ATS cases 
is too narrow, as it was created to hear international human rights cases from foreign plaintiffs, 
which often occur entirely outside the U.S. By restricting ATS cases to have some conduct happen 
within the U.S., the Court has erred in enforcing the framers’ original intentions for the ATS. 
Instead, the ATS should be broadened to hear cases of human rights violations that occur at the 
hands of a U.S. defendant outside of the U.S., thus protecting the efficiency of U.S. courts while 
simultaneously holding U.S. corporations responsible for their actions abroad. 
ATS in Aguinda I 
Originally passed by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS “has been described 
as a provision ‘unlike any other in American law’ and ‘unknown to any other legal system in the 
world.’”319 The Supreme Court stated that the ATS “was intended to promote harmony in 
international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international law violations in 
circumstances where the absence of a remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United 
States accountable.”320 The U.S. created this statute specifically for “disputes between U.S. 
citizens and citizens of foreign nations” in order to properly litigate human rights violations that 
happen abroad.321 
                                               
319 Stephen P. Mulligan, The Alien Tort Statute (ATS): A Primer, Congressional Research Service (June 1, 2018), 
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The ATS allows federal district courts with jurisdiction over the defendant to hear cases, 
as long as they meet four factors. The case must be: “(1) a civil action (2) by an alien322 (3) for a 
tort (4) committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”323 These four 
elements are met in Aguinda I. First Aguinda I was a civil case, not criminal. The second factor 
allows for cases to be heard under the ATS as long as they were brought “only by aliens.”324  “The 
ATS does not provide jurisdiction for suits alleging torts in violation of the law of nations by U.S. 
nationals.”325 Because the plaintiffs were citizens of Ecuador, this element was met. The third 
element was met because Aguinda I was a tort claim; “as a general matter, a tort is ‘a civil wrong, 
other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, [usually] in the form of 
damages[.]’”326 Here, that civil wrong was polluting the Oriente. The last factor is a bit more 
complicated, as it involved not only U.S. law, but international law. The ATS: 
 
“requires that the tort asserted be considered a violation of either the ‘law of nations’ or a 
treaty ratified by the United States. The term ‘law of nations’ is now often understood to 
refer to ‘customary international law.’327 As a general matter, customary international law 
is international law that is derived from ‘a general and consistent practice of States 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.’ State practices that form the basis for 
customary international law are often referred to as international ‘norms.’ But the process 
of identifying what norms are actionable under the ATS is a complex judicial function that 
                                               
322 An “alien” is defined elsewhere in federal law to be “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 
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was the subject of much debate and was addressed by the Supreme Court in [the 2004 case] 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.”328 
 
Sosa held that the ATS only allows federal courts to hear a “narrow set” of claims for violations 
of international law. It created a two-step test for determining whether claims fall under ATS 
liability; “first, courts must determine whether the claim is based on violation of an international 
law norm that is ‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’329 If step one is satisfied, courts must then 
“determine whether allowing the case to proceed is an “appropriate” exercise of judicial 
discretion.”330 Courts have used this two-step test to conclude that “the ATS does not reach conduct 
that occurred entirely in the territory of a foreign nation.”331 This  “presumption against 
extraterritoriality… [was] intended to avoid unintended clashes between U.S. and foreign law that 
could result in international discord.”332  
While Sosa and Kiobel were not law until 2014, under this current set of rules, the Aguinda 
I case could not be heard before the District Court today, as the conduct occurred entirely in 
Ecuador. This is outrageous for many reasons. First, the intent behind the ATS was to serve as an 
example in the international justice community by allowing aliens to bring international human 
rights violations to U.S. courts. Second, this is an obvious attempt to shield American corporations 
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from facing their heinous actions abroad. The restrictions of not hearing ATS cases where the 
conduct occurred entirely outside of the U.S. must be broadened, and there should be certain 
protections for cases brought under the ATS in regards to forum non conveniens dismissals. 
Chevron’s Use of An Arbitral Tribunal to Counteract Ecuador’s Judgment 
 By filing the 2009 PCA arbitration, Chevron asked an arbitral tribunal to re-litigate a case 
heard by the highest court of Ecuador, and in doing so, violated Ecuador’s sovereignty and allowed 
Chevron to avoid corporate liability. Because arbitration is becoming a much more popular dispute 
resolution mechanism, tribunals must carefully investigate whether the parties agreed to arbitrate 
the dispute and whether the dispute has already been decided in another court. 
When Chevron brought the 2009 PCA claim, the plaintiffs’ main argument to the tribunal 
was that Chevron attempted to “usurp the authority of the Ecuadorian judiciary,” by arguing a case 
in arbitration that had already been awarded 18 billion dollars by Ecuador’s highest court.333  When 
the question of whether the case could be heard before a tribunal came to the D.C. Circuit Court, 
they held that Ecuador “ceded that authority… by signing the BIT.”334 In fact, the Court held that 
by signing the BIT, “Ecuador agreed to allow independent and neutral arbitrators to determine 
whether an investor company could take advantage of the substantive and procedural protections 
in the BIT.”335 Chevron followed procedures laid out in the BIT to request arbitration, and the 
tribunal determined that it had jurisdiction.336 Further, the PCA took into consideration the D.C. 
Circuit courts that had heard and rejected Ecuador’s argument that Chevron “did not have the right 
                                               
333 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger., see also PCA 2009 supra note 115. 
334 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger., see also PCA 2009 supra note 115. 
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to avail itself of the BIT's arbitration clause” and found nothing that led it to believe that those 
courts had erred in their judgments.337  
However, it should not be, and is not, the place of a tribunal to ask a country’s highest court 
to cancel their judgment for a case between private parties. Arbitration was not designed as, and 
is not intended as, a form of appellate review.  There is no second shot at a favorable judgment 
just because you don’t like the first result.  This could even be considered a new type of forum 
shopping, as corporations or other defendants who have a judgment against them could attempt to 
counteract that judgment by filing arbitration disputes.  
Further, this case has been decided in Ecuador, and the fact that the tribunal essentially gets 
to litigate the case again by bringing an arbitration against the plaintiffs violates res judicata, also 
known as claim preclusion. Translated literally into “a matter judged,” claim preclusion “is the 
principle that a cause of action may not be relitigated once it has been judged on the merits.”338 
Claim preclusion exists to prevent re-litigation, promote fairness, and preserve the time and 
resources of courts. 339  
Continuing to draw out this case is inherently benefitting Chevron, who has stated publicly 
that they are in a waiting game with the plaintiffs.340 Allowing the case to drag on and on, according 
to the plaintiffs, is admittedly “Chevron’s main defense strategy… that this thing never ends. They 
[are] try[ing] to zap our resources and zap our will, and in these… years there has been a lot of 
suffering.”341 It is simply poor public policy to allow corporations to escape liability through 
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arbitration. At this point, the tribunal is harboring Chevron from facing judgments in a case that 
has already been decided.  
Arbitration is not inherently bad; U.S. corporations should be able to contract with 
governments and have the disputes be resolved in a neutral forum under terms they agree to. The 
problem here is that neither the plaintiffs or Ecuador agreed to these terms; this entire saga started 
years before the BIT was implemented and neither agreed to pursue this series of claims in 
arbitration. Their courts had already litigated this case for a decade, and the tribunal overstepped 
by hearing an arbitration.  Forcing the plaintiffs and the government of Ecuador into a dispute that 
has already been litigated and in tribunal that they did not consent to is bad public policy. In the 
future, arbitral tribunals should weigh more carefully claims they arbitrate in order to respect the 
sovereignty of courts who have already litigated claims and promote fairness for both parties, who 
have already had their bite at the apple. 
The Dangers of 28 U.S.C. §1782 International Discovery Evidence in U.S. Courts  
 There is a discrepancy between the standards for obtaining evidence through discovery in 
U.S. courts and obtaining evidence through a §1782 claim, also known as international discovery. 
Because the standard of review is lower for international discovery than it is for discovery in the 
U.S., standards must be adjusted, and evidence must be reviewed so that defendants in U.S. courts 
who are facing evidence obtained through international discovery are appropriately protected by 
the First Amendment. 
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The Outtakes: Coming to a §1782 Claim Near You 
When Chevron filed the 2009 PCA arbitration, they also filed motions under 28 U.S.C. 
§1782.342 This statute, entitled “Assistance to Foreign and International Tribunals and to Litigants 
before such Tribunals,” allows for international discovery of testimonial or documentary evidence. 
In essence, the district court of a region where a person resides can “order him to give his testimony 
or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 
international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation.”343 
In order to meet the requirements for this statute one only needs to show that (1) they are an 
“interested person” in a foreign proceeding, (2) the proceeding is before a foreign tribunal, and (3) 
the person from whom the information is sought is in the district of the court where the application 
is filed.344  However, a  person may not be compelled to give his statement or “to produce a 
document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.”345 Since 2010, there have 
been “more than 50 orders and opinions involving Section §1782, and Chevron alone has brought 
over 23 actions pursuant to the statute.”346 
Courts have described the: “twin aims of Section §1782: to provide equitable and efficient 
discovery procedures in US courts for the benefit of participants in adjudicative proceedings 
outside the US, and to encourage other countries to provide similar means of assistance to US 
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courts.”347 Section §1782 is clearly contentious: the Supreme Court is divided over the statute and 
appellate courts cannot agree on whether an arbitral tribunal is even eligible to be a foreign 
tribunal.348 Although here it is a weapon in Chevron’s war against paying the judgment, it has been 
used to benefit the little guy in the past. NGOs and other international claimants have used this 
mechanism to obtain information from U.S. citizens in the past to uncover corrupt business 
practices and human rights abuses.349 
Despite this, Chevron succeeded in their motions, and subsequently forced the plaintiffs to 
hand over a variety of evidence. This included Donziger’s personal computer hard drive and other 
internal documents. It also included “internal documents of the Plaintiffs’ scientific experts and 
consultants…bank account information… and testimony from former insiders including 
financiers, attorneys, scientific experts, and consultants.”350 Notably, one of the §1782 motions 
was filed in the Southern District of New York and heard before none other than Judge Kaplan; he 
determined the §1782 motion that included the outtakes of the documentary Crude. 
In response, the plaintiffs filed many motions to fight these orders. The plaintiffs argued 
that Kaplan should recuse himself from the case, due to the fact that he was biased from Chevron’s 
RICO case. He refused. The plaintiffs argued that the raw footage and outtakes fell under the 
freedom of the press protections granted to journalists. Kaplan disagreed, noting that “the subjects 
of the documentary had signed releases expressly disclaiming any expectation of confidentiality,” 
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therefore, “the filmmaker possessed an ‘uncontrolled right’ to make public all or any part of the 
material, and that the Crude outtakes were thus non-confidential.351  Further, the court held that 
because “footage included in an earlier version of Crude offered on Netflix, but deleted from the 
final version sold in the United States (at the direction of class action plaintiffs’ counsel)” showed 
some incriminating behavior, and the court thought there would be more.352  The Plaintiffs stated 
that the emails were attorney work product, and thus protected under attorney client privilege. The 
courts did not budge. As a result of the motions, they also forced Donziger testify about his 
behavior in Ecuador; Judge Kaplan held that the need to depose Donziger was “extremely great,” 
even though deposing opposing council is practically unheard of.353  
The problem with international discovery is that this evidence from the 2009 PCA 
arbitration has been used in the fight against Donziger stateside. In particular, if Chevron was to 
subpoena the outtakes from Crude for the first time in U.S. courts, they would be considered 
nonconfidential press materials, which are “protected by qualified journalists' privilege.”354 In 
Gonzales, the court provided that a “civil litigant seeking compelled disclosure of materials from 
nonparty press entity may overcome the privilege upon showing that materials are of likely 
relevance to significant issue in the case, and are not reasonably obtainable from other available 
sources” but the standard for overcoming the privilege is more demanding than in an arbitration 
or international forum.355 These standards should be equal, if not more protected in U.S. courts, as 
the Bill of Rights places an important emphasis on freedom of the press. It is important that U.S. 
citizens receive protections in arbitral or international proceedings, particularly if the evidence 
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used in international discovery is going to be used against them in a U.S. court, as is the case here. 
Further, it is important the U.S. courts examine this evidence taken through a §1782 claim and 
hold it to a standard of review equal to what it would be in U.S. courts.  
In my interview with Donziger, we talked some about how this case was a trailblazer. When 
it comes to the use of Crude in court, this arbitration is no exception. Not only is using arbitration 
to re-litigate claims wrong, using international discovery, and then applying that evidence in a U.S. 
court, is wrong.  U.S. law needs to adopt a test for whether evidence brought in a §1782 claim can 
be used in a separate U.S. claim. 
 
The Need for a Federal Anti-SLAPP Statute 
 There is no reason for this case to have lasted almost three decades, except for the fact that 
Chevron continues to file SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) cases in order 
to keep the plaintiffs busy.356 Chevron has filed hundreds of these suits, even attempting to silence 
advocacy groups like Greenpeace from speaking out against the judgment in Ecuador.357 The 
purpose of filing these frivolous claims is not to win them, but rather to “intimidate, harass, 
demonize, and bankrupt the weaker opponent.”358 While SLAPP lawsuits have an actual cause of 
action, their “claims for defamation, tortious interference or related theories – [are] a secondary 
motivation at best.”359 Many states have special protections for SLAPP cases, but “corporations 
[can] still [forum] shop around for lax jurisdictions and sympathetic judges.”360  
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While many states have anti-SLAPP statutes, there is currently no federal statute, thus 
leaving corporations the ability file a suit in federal court, have federal law apply, and then proceed 
to harass and “demonize” plaintiffs’ in federal court.361Adopting a federal anti-SLAPP statute 
would “allow for early dismissals of meritless lawsuits filed against people for the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.”362 It would also help eliminate: 
“retaliatory lawsuits brought to intimidate and silence opponents and critics who had 
spoken out in the public sphere... about a matter of public concern related to health, safety, 
environmental, economic or community well-being, the government, a public official or 
public figure or a good, product or service in the marketplace.”363 
Currently, the American Legislative Exchange Council has a Public Participation Protection Act, 
which serves as anti-SLAPP model legislation; this legislation draws from current state anti-
SLAPP statutes. Adopting this act would allow for “special motions to dismiss against lawsuits 
brought in response to a defendant exercising their rights to free speech, petition, or association, 
including communicating in a public form about a matter of public concern.”  The Act would also 
allow “judges to award costs and attorney fees to prevailing parties or against parties whose special 
motions to dismiss are frivolous.”364 
The law should prevent potential litigants from filing retaliatory lawsuits, in turn promoting 
greater efficiency in the courts and protecting potential defendants who do not have the time or 
resources to litigate these claims, and thus remain silent on the issue. Efficiency, so that issues are 
not drawn out for decades, and protections for victims of corporations filing frivolous lawsuits to 
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silence potential victims, are perhaps two of the most important lessons U.S. law can take from 
Aguinda. Demonizing an advocate should not be a way to navigate around the enforcement of a 
judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 89 
CONCLUSION 
“Simply tell us how much to make the check for, so we can see if we can reach an 
agreement today.” – a representative from Chevron in Crude in 2009.365 Ironic, because the 
plaintiffs offered to settle in the U.S. for 140 million in 1999, and Texaco did not even 
counteroffer.366 
 The Aguinda saga is one of sadness, greed, and perseverance, framed within a network of 
judges, arbitrators, lawyers, and laws that have failed them. If the case had, in fact, been settled in 
1999, things would have been better for every party involved. The unfortunate truth, no matter 
from whose perspective, is that the indigenous people of Ecuador are suffering. Without question, 
there is a horrid injury that has hurt and affected this community in ways no one can understand 
without living it. The other unfortunate truth is that greed is the theme throughout this decades 
long litigation. If Texaco and Chevron, or even the funders behind the plaintiffs, paid half of what 
they contributed to their attorneys’ fees to cleaning up the Oriente, things would be long since 
settled. Unfortunately, the world does not work that way.  
 From this litigation we can learn a few things, and subsequently, the law can change for 
the betterment of others. Judgments rendered after forum non conveniens dismissals should be 
relitigated on the merits if there are allegations of corruption. The current restrictions for when 
federal courts can hear Alien Tort Statute cases are too narrow and must be broadened to protect 
international human rights victims. The growing trend in international business toward arbitration 
is good, but the tribunal erred in re-litigating the case, and accordingly, arbitral tribunals must be 
more diligent in investigating whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. There is a need for a higher 
standard of review when using evidence obtained in a §1782 international discovery claim in U.S. 
Courts. Finally, a federal anti-SLAPP statute should be adopted and enforced to prevent 
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harassment and frivolous lawsuits. Whether these changes would help the plaintiffs now is clear. 
Although the plaintiffs have already obtained “justice” in Ecuador, there may be no remedy the 
judicial system can provide for them. 
Chevron once said that they would fight this case “until hell freezes over… and then we 
will fight on the ice.”367 Unfortunately for them, it will likely never ice over in the Amazon, but 
they may have to fight in molten temperatures due to global warming. Instead of focusing on 
cleaning up the Amazon, both parties are focused on tainted verdicts and billions of dollars, at the 
cost of the indigenous people of Lago Agrio. 
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